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ARTICLE 
Kevin H. Michels 
The Corporate Attorney as “Internal” Gatekeeper and the In 
Pari Delicto Defense: A Proposed New Standard 
 
Abstract.  This Article begins by proposing a distinction between the 
corporate lawyer’s “internal” and “external” gatekeeping role in order to focus 
on the special challenge posed by the former.  As internal gatekeeper, the 
corporation lawyer is charged with the restraint of the corporation’s executives 
and other employees to prevent harm to the lawyer’s corporation client.  The 
external gatekeeper, by contrast, restrains the client to prevent harm to third 
parties.  While each gatekeeping role presents challenges in defining the duties 
and liability of attorneys, the internal-gatekeeping role is subject to a special 
defense that can insulate attorneys from liability.  Attorneys can interpose an 
in pari delicto defense to corporation claims for malpractice, arguing that 
knowledge of the executive’s wrongdoing should be imputed to the 
corporation and, as a result, the latter should be barred from recovery because 
it is “equally or more culpable” than the failed attorney gatekeeper.  To date, 
courts have struggled to determine when executive wrongdoing should be 
imputed to the corporation, and whether and how to craft exceptions to 
accommodate the divergent goals of holding corporations accountable for 
their agents’ wrongdoing, while incentivizing lawyers to perform properly as 
internal gatekeepers. 
This Article proposes what it terms the “gatekeeper-imputation” exception 
to the general rule that knowledge of the executive’s wrongdoing should be 
imputed to the corporation when attorneys seek to interpose an in pari delicto 
defense to allegations of malpractice by a corporate client.  When the law firm 
has expressly or impliedly assumed an obligation to identify or report 
employee wrongdoing, then information that would have been discovered had
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the law firm fulfilled that obligation, should not be imputed to the 
corporation for purposes of the in pari delicto defense.  Whether the attorney 
has assumed a gatekeeping role, in turn, should be informed by the express 
agreements of the corporation and law firm, and in the absence of such 
agreement, the ethical and statutory gatekeeping duties typically imposed on 
counsel.  The proposed standard will respect the normative basis for 
imputation, while optimizing the gatekeeping incentives of the corporation 
and the law firm. 
Author.   Donald and Va Lena Curran Chair in Legal Ethics and 
Professionalism and Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Gonzaga University 
School of Law; Associate Professor, The College of New Jersey.  The author 
wishes to thank the St. Mary’s Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics for the 
invitation to write this Article, Kathryn Hockenjos, Stephen Sepinuck and 
Gonzaga Law School’s Annual Corporate Symposium for their comments on 
earlier drafts of this work.  Thanks also to Meaghan Driscoll for research 
assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The vision of the corporation attorney as “gatekeeper” has gained 
currency in recent years, even if the precise contours of that role remain 
less than clear.  At a minimum, the lawyer-gatekeeper serves as a voice of 
client restraint in preventing wrongdoing as a part of her commitment to 
the client, third parties, and the legal order.  Although “gatekeeping” often 
entails restraining the corporation client to protect third parties who might 
be harmed by the client’s wrongdoing,1 it also includes a lawyer’s effort to 
prevent harm to the corporation client.2  While we speak in broad strokes 
about gatekeeping, a single term applied to the lawyer’s prevention of 
wrongdoing obscures a critical distinction: as a result of the in pari delicto 
defense discussed below, the legal standards for recovery against a lawyer 
for failure in the gatekeeping role vary dramatically, depending on whether 
the party alleging harm is the corporation client or a third party. 
This Article begins by offering a new taxonomy to refine our 
understanding of the corporate lawyer’s gatekeeping role.  It distinguishes 
between “internal” gatekeeping—designed to protect the corporation 
client from harm—and “external” gatekeeping—in which the lawyer seeks 
 
1. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant 
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 304 (2004) (describing gatekeepers as “the professionals who serve 
investors by preparing, verifying, or certifying corporate disclosures to the securities markets”). 
2. E.g., Rutheford B Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of Transactional 
Lawyers to Act As Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 9 (2003) (discussing lawyer gatekeeping and 
focusing on “the lawyer’s duty to take action within the corporation to protect the corporate client 
from harm and restrict the lawyer’s participation in the corporate manager’s misconduct”). 
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to prevent the corporation or its actors from harming third parties.  After 
distinguishing the internal and external gatekeeping roles, this Article turns 
to a distinctive challenge posed by the internal-gatekeeping role.  In certain 
instances, the lawyer who fails in her duty to protect the client harms the 
corporation through a breach of the duty of care.  If the corporation is to 
be made whole, and the incentives for internal gatekeeping are to be 
optimized, the corporation must—in certain circumstances—have the 
right to recover damages resulting from the lawyer’s breach.  The 
corporation’s recovery for malpractice for this failed gatekeeping role will 
be far from straightforward, however.  The corporation client that sues its 
own lawyer for failure in the gatekeeper role will face the centuries-old, 
equitable defense of in pari delicto.  In pari delicto or “in equal fault” bars a 
plaintiff from recovering against a tortfeasor when the plaintiff’s 
wrongdoing was equal to or greater than the defendant’s.3 
The defense itself seems sensible in the traditional setting of attorney 
and client: it is grounded on the equitable notion that courts should not 
compensate the client for his own intentional or criminal wrongdoing.4  
The defense takes a curious turn, however, when the malpractice plaintiff 
is a corporation whose executive has committed fraud or other 
wrongdoing, and the defendant is the lawyer who failed to discover or 
report this information to the corporation client.5  Citing agency law 
principles, courts have imputed knowledge of the wrongful acts of the 
executive to the corporation.6  As a result, courts have held that the 
corporation whose executive committed the crime or fraud is equally or 
more guilty than the attorney who failed to discover or report the 
wrongdoing, thereby shielding the attorney from corporate claims for 
malpractice under the in pari delicto defense.7  Thus understood, the in 
 
3. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985) (defining the 
common law defense in pari delicto); Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 151 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting 
in pari delicto bars “plaintiffs from recovering damages resulting from their own wrongdoing”); Am. 
Trade Partners, LP v. A–1 Int’l Importing Enters., Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 273, 276 (E.D. Pa. 1991) 
(using in pari delicto to determine whether recovery of damages is barred). 
4. See Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 306 (noting that it is inequitable to “mediat[e] disputes 
among wrongdoers”); Am. Trade Partners, LP, 770 F. Supp. at 276 (explaining in pari delicto). 
5. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 1982) (asking whether 
the defendant is “entitled to use the wrongdoing of Cenco’s managers as a defense against the charges 
of breach of contract, professional malpractice, and fraud”). 
6. See id. at 456 (noting that the jury was instructed that it could attribute management fraud 
on behalf of the corporation to the corporations); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 
Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 325 
(Pa. 2010) (recognizing that many courts impute fraud by management to the corporation). 
7. See Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456 (holding that Cenco is unable to claim in pari delicto); 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 989 A.2d at 325 (deciding Cenco is unable to claim in pari delicto). 
8 MICHELS_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:21 AM 
322 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 4:318 
pari delicto defense can insulate counsel from civil accountability for failing 
to detect or take actions to prevent the intentional or criminal wrongdoing 
of executives. 
Corporations may expect—if not expressly retain counsel to serve in the 
gatekeeper function—in part to prevent executives from involving the 
corporation in fraudulent or criminal activities.  Should the in pari delicto 
defense categorically eliminate the right of corporations to rely on 
attorneys in fulfilling their ethical and statutory duties to prevent executive 
wrongdoing?  Is this the price we must pay for a coherent in pari delicto 
defense?  And if so, is the corporate attorney really an internal gatekeeper 
by any measure that matters? 
Part I will begin by distinguishing the internal and external gatekeeping 
roles, and ground the discussion by offering examples of the archetypal 
internal-gatekeeping failure—the corporate attorney who breaches a duty 
to investigate, discover or report an executive’s criminal or fraudulent 
wrongdoing.8  Part II will examine the corporation lawyer’s ethical duties 
in these circumstances—since such duties will prove relevant under the 
proposal that is offered later in this Article.  Part II will next ask whether 
the corporate client could make out a prima facie malpractice case against 
the lawyer on these facts, exploring the critical relation between ethical 
breaches by counsel and claims for malpractice. 
Part III will examine how the corporation’s case against its duty-
breaching attorney would fare under the in pari delicto defense.  It will 
provide an overview of the defense, its development generally and in 
connection with claims against gatekeepers—attorneys and others—in the 
corporate setting.  The central question, it turns out, is when the 
wrongdoing of the executive should be imputed to the corporation, 
thereby rendering the corporation subject to the in pari delicto defense.  
Part III will provide a sketch of approaches that courts have fashioned on 
the imputation question, parsing them into three categories for discussion 
purposes.  Part IV will explore the tensions posed by the sometimes 
conflicting goals of imputation and gatekeeping that are galvanized by the 
in pari delicto defense. 
Part V will seek to reconcile those competing goals into a new 
 
8. We will focus on the hypotheticals of this kind because in many ways they are the archetypal 
gatekeeping failure, and the criminal or fraudulent nature of the wrongdoing directly implicates the 
in pari delicto defense.  There are, of course, other scenarios in which the attorney’s failures to prevent 
client wrongdoing could harm the corporation—the failure to prevent breaches of fiduciary duty, for 
example.  Because in pari delicto is an equitable defense, and given the delicate distinctions that 
inform our analysis of when it should and should not apply, the reader should not assume that the 
analysis here applies without qualification to other attorney internal-gatekeeper failings. 
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imputation exception focused on whether the lawyer has expressly or 
impliedly assumed gatekeeping duties.  This “gatekeeper-imputation 
exception” will invite courts to respect any express agreement between the 
corporation and the law firm with respect to the latter’s gatekeeping duties 
and, in the absence of such agreement, to isolate attorney ethical or 
statutory gatekeeping failures as those that should not be subject to 
imputation.  Part V will apply the test across the range of hypotheticals 
introduced in Part I, and explain why the proposed test respects the 
normative basis for imputation, while optimizing the gatekeeping 
incentives of the corporation and the law firm. 
I.     THE PROBLEM: CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES 
A. The Internal and External Gatekeeping Roles 
When corporation employees engage in wrongdoing, the victims are 
often legion—the corporation itself, the shareholders, and third parties 
who were harmed by the wrongdoing.  In certain instances, the 
corporation attorney, as gatekeeper, must take action to prevent 
wrongdoing by the corporation client.  When she fails to take such action 
despite an obligation to do so, those who are harmed may seek recovery 
against the lawyer. 
The challenges posed by claims against lawyers for failings in the 
gatekeeping role can vary considerably depending on who brings the claim.  
When those who are not a party to the attorney–client relationship sue the 
attorney, courts have struggled with whether and when to allow such 
claims.  Claims by non-clients or third parties are challenging in part 
because they may, if recognized, create obligations that undermine the 
attorney’s duties to her client.  In earlier works, I have explained the 
external-gatekeeping challenges at length.9  When the client sues the 
attorney for failures in the gatekeeping role, the analysis differs radically.  
Here, we are less concerned with the tensions posed by competing 
obligations: the duty to the client is readily recognized under basic 
malpractice principles.  Instead, we face a distinctive barrier to analysis of 
the malpractice claim against the lawyer for failed gatekeeping.  If the 
 
9. See Kevin H. Michels, Third-Party Negligence Claims Against Counsel: A Proposed Unified 
Liability Standard, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 143, 159–69 (2009) (proposing a test to determine 
when attorneys should be liable for negligence to nonclients); see also Kevin H. Michels, Lawyer 
Independence: From Ideal to Viable Legal Standard, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 85, 111–20 (2010) 
(arguing that the lawyer’s independent requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct are 
designed to prevent the client from harming third parties). 
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wrongdoing is that of a corporate employee, should we ascribe knowledge 
of the wrongdoing to the corporation?  If so, should the corporation’s 
“knowledge” bar it from suing its own attorney? 
Given the distinct challenges posed by claims against gatekeepers, we 
might profitably parse the gatekeeping role into two categories: internal 
and external.  The internal-gatekeeping role concerns protection of the 
client against wrongdoing caused by its employees.  Often these corporate 
employees will harm third parties through criminal or fraudulent behavior, 
and the third party will sue the corporation for damages resulting from 
such wrongful behavior.  Even though a third party is involved, the 
corporation may seek recovery against its lawyer for failure to discover or 
report the executive wrongdoing that lead to its liability to a third party.  
Because the claim is one of malpractice by the corporation against its own 
lawyer for failure to take action that lead to the corporation’s losses, I will 
characterize this as internal-gatekeeping question.  The external-
gatekeeping role concerns the lawyer’s protection of third parties, i.e., 
those other than the client, against the wrongdoing of the corporation and 
its representatives.  While there is clearly overlap between the internal and 
external-gatekeeping roles, they are sharply distinct in terms of who seeks 
relief against the lawyer—the corporation client or the third party.   
In this Article, I propose to examine a central challenge posed by the 
internal-gatekeeping role—asking when we should ascribe the wrongdoing 
of the corporate representative to the entity itself, and whether such 
knowledge should bar corporations from suing their attorneys for failure in 
the internal-gatekeeping role.  To ground our discussion, I will offer some 
examples of the failed internal-gatekeeping role below. 
B. Internal Gatekeeping Failures: Examples 
The troubling behavior often begins with the rogue executive—the 
CEO, President, Vice President, or executive below the officer rank who 
engages in wrongdoing of some kind or another.  The gatekeeping 
problem concerns the corporation lawyer’s knowledge, discovery, or 
reporting of the executive’s wrongdoing.  In each of the examples that 
follow, we will assume that the corporation has no actual knowledge of the 
executive’s wrongdoing.  The question in each of the examples is whether 
the law firm should bear liability for its failure to discover or report the 
executive’s wrongdoing to the board of directors of the corporation. 
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Hypothetical A: The “Knowing” but Silent Attorney 
 
Mary Roberts, outside counsel to Fast Pharma, Inc. (“Fast”), learns that 
four individuals have suffered strokes during the clinical trials of the 
company’s memory-improvement medicine.  Division Vice President Joe 
Davis instructs Roberts not to list the four “adverse” events in its periodic 
reporting to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  Roberts advises 
Davis that nondisclosure is unlawful, and states that he will handle the 
filings himself.  Roberts does not participate in the periodic company 
reporting, but takes no other action to prevent the false filings.  After 
additional injuries, an investigation discovers that the company withheld 
information from the FDA, and a criminal indictment and personal injury 
actions are lodged against the company.  Fast sues Roberts and her firm. 
 
Hypothetical B: The Reckless or Willfully Blind Attorney 
 
In scenario A, assume instead that Davis has told Mary nothing about 
the adverse events, but that Mary learns of allegations suggesting such 
wrongdoing.  She intentionally chooses not to ask follow-up questions, on 
the theory that she might turn suspicion into “knowledge” of wrongdoing 
and therefore be required to report on the executive’s wrongful design.  
She files the FDA report, which lists no adverse events.  The corporation 
later discovers that the company withheld information from the FDA, and 
a criminal indictment and personal injury actions are lodged against the 
company.  Fast sues Roberts and her firm. 
 
Hypothetical C: The Negligent Attorney 
 
In scenario A, assume instead that Mary has no knowledge of the 
adverse events, but hears a rumor suggesting such wrongdoing.  She 
negligently (let us assume) fails to ask follow-up questions, and files the 
reporting document with the FDA, which lists no adverse events.  The 
corporation later discovers that the company withheld information from 
the FDA, and a criminal indictment and personal injury actions are lodged 
against the company.  Fast sues Roberts and her firm. 
 
Hypothetical D: The Negligent Investigator 
 
In scenario C, assume instead that Mary has no knowledge of the 
adverse events, and that the corporation, having received an anonymous 
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tip on the employee hotline, suspects that some adverse advents may not 
have been reported.  Fast hires Roberts and her law firm to conduct an 
internal investigation.  Roberts and her firm conduct the investigation 
negligently and discover no wrongdoing.  Fast completes its filing without 
disclosing any adverse events.  Fast later discovers that it withheld 
information from the FDA, and a criminal indictment and personal injury 
actions are lodged against the company.  Fast sues Roberts and her firm. 
While the particulars vary, each hypothetical describes instances in 
which failings by corporate attorneys are connected with a harm suffered 
by the company.  In each instance, the corporate executive has engaged in 
intentional wrongdoing, and counsel failed to take action that likely would 
have prevented the wrongdoing.  In the second and third scenarios, the 
attorney not only failed to prevent the wrongdoing, she engaged in 
affirmative efforts to further the fraud—witting or otherwise. 
 
Hypothetical E: The Thieving CEO 
 
Consider a new scenario.  Attorney Roberts knows or has reason to 
know that Division Vice President Joe Davis owns a dummy corporation 
that, unbeknownst to others at Fast, is receiving payments from Fast.  She 
does not advise the President or the board of the wrongdoing.  Upon 
discovering Davis’s theft, Fast sues Roberts and her firm. 
In each of the examples, we are focused on whether the corporation can 
bring a claim against the lawyer for failure to prevent some portion of the 
losses that would have been prevented by the lawyer’s disclosure to officials 
who were higher up within the organization.  Our question here is not 
whether the attorney breached a duty by failing to disclose to parties 
beyond the corporation, such as shareholders who might have prevented the 
fraud or potential victims who might have avoided the harm with the 
benefit of notice.10  By restricting our inquiry to this question, we isolate 
the central challenge posed by corporate malpractice claims against lawyers 
who fail in the internal-gatekeeping role: the lawyer’s interposition of the 
in pari delicto defense.11  The defense will assert that the wrongdoing of 
 
10. These are important gatekeeping questions, of course, but they are outside the scope of this 
Article, which isolates the “internal gatekeeping” questions in order to explore the in pari delicto 
defense. 
11. A valuable scholarly treatment of attorney gatekeeper liability is found in George C. Harris, 
Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm to Organizational 
Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597 (1998).  That 
piece considers attorney liability not only for failings in what I term the “internal” gatekeeping role, 
but also for failures to disclose beyond the corporation.  The breadth of the article prevents Professor 
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the executive should be imputed to the corporation, even though the latter 
is—we shall assume—unaware of the wrongdoing.  Before we consider the 
defense, however, it would be helpful to analyze the propriety of the 
attorney’s behavior in each instance under the ethics rules and legal 
malpractice standards. 
II.     THE PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST COUNSEL 
In this section, we will examine the nature of the attorney’s wrongdoing 
in each of the hypotheticals offered in Part I, and ask whether the 
corporation can make a prima facie case of malpractice prior to 
interposition of the in pari delicto defense.  I will begin by offering a brief 
overview of the relationship between a breach of the legal ethics rules and 
malpractice.  Thereafter, I will examine the attorney’s behavior under the 
attorney ethics rules.  I will then consider the legal malpractice standards in 
light of the ethics analysis and the more general duties of care imposed on 
attorneys.  Later in this Article, the ethics analysis will return to center 
stage in explaining how the courts should evaluate the in pari delicto 
defense.12 
A. The Ethics Rules 
As a general rule, a breach of the attorney ethics rules is not the basis for 
a cause of action against counsel for malpractice.  The ethics rules can, 
however, provide evidence of the duty of care owed to the client.  
Accordingly, a breach of the ethics rules is evidence of a breach of the duty 
of care in a malpractice matter brought by the client against counsel.  
Thus, a critical threshold question is whether the attorneys violated the 
attorney ethics rules in the hypotheticals offered in Part I. 
We will begin with Rule 1.13(b) of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct,13 which is worth quoting in its entirety: 
 
Harris from engaging in an extended analysis of the in pari delicto question addressed here, which he 
in passing suggests should be treated as “a matter of duty and causation.”  Id. at 631.  In Part V. 
subsection A., I argue that a duty of care analysis alone is insufficient, and propose a new test by 
which to determine when imputation is inappropriate, focusing on the importance of the lawyer’s 
gatekeeping role in the corporation’s overall monitoring efforts. 
12. See infra Part V., subsection A. 
13. The American Bar Association promulgated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 
1983, and has amended them frequently thereafter.  CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY AM. BAR 
ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013).  Forty-nine states have adopted 
some version of the Model Rules, often with amendments.  See ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 51:303–04 at 247 (Mar. 31, 2010) (providing an overview of state 
variations of ABA Model Rules).  California is also considering adoption of the Model Rules.  See 
Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct, THE ST. BAR OF CAL., http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/ 
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If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other 
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act[,] 
or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of 
a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably 
might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is 
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.  Unless the 
lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the 
organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in 
the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest 
authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by 
applicable law.14  
The lawyer in hypothetical A knew that an officer or other employee 
(Davis) was about to act wrongfully.15  The question is whether the 
wrongdoing is of the type identified by Model Rule 1.13 as reason for 
action by the lawyer. 
Under Model Rule 1.13(b), the question is whether the executive 
intended to (or did) (1) violate “a legal obligation to” the corporation, or 
(2) violate a “law that reasonably might be imputed” to the corporation, 
which (3) is likely to result in substantial injury to the corporation.16  In 
A, the attorney was about to withhold critical safety information from the 
FDA, a violation of FDA regulations17 and a potentially criminal act that 
would be imputed to the corporation.  Moreover, by engaging in fraud, 
even fraud that is not theft from the corporation, the executive may be 
violating the fiduciary duty of care owed to the corporation18 and the 
implied or express terms of his employment agreement.19  The 
Restatement Governing Lawyers provides that an executive “violates a legal 
obligation to the organization” by an “act or failure to act . . . that, 
although perhaps intended to serve an interest of the organization, will 
foreseeably cause injury to the client, such as by exposing the organization 
 
Portals/9/documents/CRRPC/RRC%20Final%20Docs/ProposedRulesofProfessionalConduct01101
4.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2014) (“[T]he State Bar submitted an initial group of proposed Rules of 
Professional Conduct to the Supreme Court for approval.”). 
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2013). 
15. Id. R. 1.0(f). 
16. Id. 
17. 21 C.F.R. § 314(c) (2013). 
18. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42(a) (2002) (imposing duty of care on officers); id. 
§ 8.42(b)(2) (requiring officer to report “actual probable violation of material law” to superior officer 
or board). 
19. Antioch Litig. Trust v. McDermott Will & Emery LLP, 738 F. Supp. 2d 758, 766 (S.D. 
Ohio 2010); In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 777 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
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to criminal or civil liability[,]”20 a standard clearly satisfied here. 
In addition, the executive’s wrongdoing in A seems likely to visit 
substantial harm to the corporation.  The nondisclosure could lead to a 
criminal charge and expose the corporation to substantial civil liability.  
The fraud on the FDA coupled with the presumed continued sales of the 
drug made possible by such fraud could lead to massive personal injury 
liability. 
Thus, it is clear that the executive in A triggered an obligation of the 
attorney to act.  The lawyer’s obligation is straightforward enough under 
Model Rule 1.13.  She should have “[referred] the matter to higher 
authority within the organization.”21  This is hardly an extraordinary 
demand.  In A, it would entail advising the Division President or the 
Board of Directors.  The duty is slight and it presents almost no 
countervailing concern: it does, at least in the first instance, require 
reporting beyond the corporation, so client confidentiality is not 
threatened by the reporting.  Moreover, the duty reflects the black letter 
law of entity representation: the lawyer owes his duties to the organization, 
not the constituents.22  The duty to report to a higher authority in the 
organization also aligns with the other ethical duties imposed on 
counsel.23  Model Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.6(b) allows 
reporting beyond the corporation in order to prevent reasonably certain 
crime or fraud that will result in substantial injury to another.24  The 
lawyer does not perform competently25 or diligently26 if she fails to report 
to others within an organization that a constituent is about to expose the 
organization to grave harm.27  The lawyer’s silence likewise conflicts with 
 
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. f (2000).  The 
Restatement comment interprets a standard nearly identical to that contained in Model Rule 1.13(a): 
requiring action by the lawyer when the executive “violates a legal obligation to the organization.”  
Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2013). 
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2013). 
22. See id. R. 1.13(a) (“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the 
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”).  Moreover, “a lawyer representing 
only an organization does not owe duties of care, diligence, or confidentiality to constituents of the 
organization.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. b (2000) 
(citations and footnotes omitted). 
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2013). 
24. Id. R. 1.6(b). 
25. See id. R. 1.1 (“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness 
and preparation reasonably necessary for representation.”). 
26. See id. R. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
a client.”). 
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. e (2000) (“A 
lawyer is also required to act diligently . . . by taking steps to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to a 
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the lawyer’s communication as well.28 
The lawyer’s duty in B is complicated by the lawyer’s reckless disregard 
of evidence of the executive’s wrongdoing or willful blindness.  We will 
assume that the lawyer was “successful” in her efforts to remain ignorant, 
and that she does not have “knowledge” as defined by RPC 1.0(f), i.e., 
“actual knowledge of the fact in question.”29  A critical question is 
whether this behavior would somehow insulate her from ethical 
wrongdoing.  I have argued elsewhere that an attorney’s decision to ignore 
evidence that arouses reasonable suspicion of client crime or a fraud before 
furthering a client transaction violates the attorney’s duty to exercise 
independent professional judgment under RPC 2.1.30  The willful 
blindness likely violates the duties of competence and diligence as well. 
In C and D, the lawyer’s mental state falls below that which would 
trigger either a reporting requirement under RPC 1.13 or a duty of further 
investigation under RPC 2.1.  Although negligent behavior may violate the 
duties of competence and diligence, we should be slow to cast all acts of 
negligence as ethical breaches.  It is true, however, that the attorney in each 
of these scenarios has failed her client in a critical gatekeeping sense—by 
failing to take reasonable actions that likely would have led to discovery 
and prevention of intentional wrongdoing. 
In E, the facts have changed substantially.  When the lawyer has 
knowledge of the executive’s thieving from the corporation, her inaction 
and silence are clearly a breach of that Rule 1.13(b).31  When the lawyer’s 
mental state falls below knowledge, Rule 1.13(b) would not be triggered, 
and thus “reason to know” may fall short of such knowledge, as discussed 
earlier.32 
B. Malpractice: The Prima-Facie Claim 
If the attorneys in at least some, if not all, of our hypotheticals are to be 
internal gatekeepers—that is, if they have some duties to protect the 
 
client.”). 
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2013) (“A lawyer shall explain a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding 
the representation.”). 
29. Id. R. 1.0(f) (“A person’s knowledge can be inferred from circumstances.”); see also id. R. 
1.0 cmt. 3 (“As defined in Rule 1.0(f), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer 
cannot ignore the obvious.”). 
30. Kevin H. Michels, Lawyer Independence: From Ideal to Viable Legal Standard, 61 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 85, 96 (2010). 
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2013). 
32. Id.; Id. R. 1.0 (f); T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern 
Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 377, 399–400 (2008). 
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corporation client from the wrongdoing of its executives in certain 
instances—then it seems fair to ask whether any financial responsibility 
will attach for their dereliction of that duty.33  In this section, we will 
consider whether the corporation in our hypotheticals can satisfy the basic 
elements of a malpractice claim against counsel.  In Part III, we will 
explore the in pari delicto defense that counsel would likely interpose in 
response to a malpractice claim. 
In order to prevail in a malpractice claim against the attorneys in A and 
B, the corporations must establish that: (1) the defendant owed the 
plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached this duty; (3) the 
breach was the cause of plaintiff’s harm; and (4) plaintiff suffered 
damages.34  The first of these elements is beyond question: the attorney 
owes a duty of care to the client simply by dint of the attorney–client 
relationship.35  The second element of a malpractice claim often takes 
center stage because of the challenges posed by establishing the contents of 
the duty owed to the client, and it will be the centerpiece of our discussion 
here.  The corporations in our hypotheticals will require expert testimony 
to establish the content of the duty of care in a malpractice claim.36  The 
third and fourth elements are largely fact questions, although our 
circumstances pose challenges that warrant mention here. 
In the analysis that follows, we will consider both a breach of the ethics 
rules and a breach of the standard of care.  The ethics rules are relevant 
here for two reasons.  First, the corporation’s expert can cite the attorney-
ethics rules as evidence of the duty of care, provided that the rule was 
designed to protect the client in the circumstances in question.37  Second, 
the ethics analysis will bear on our analysis of whether the in pari delicto 
defense should apply (as discussed in Part IV, subsection A).  Of course, an 
 
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 50 (2000) (“The provision 
of a civil remedy is also important because the lawyer owes special obligations to a client and because 
the proper functioning of the legal system depends on competent legal representation.”).  “For 
purposes of liability . . . a lawyer owes a client the duty to exercise care . . . in pursuing the client’s 
lawful objectives in matters covered by representation.”  Id. 
34. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 165–
66 (5th ed. 1984). 
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 50 (2000).  In fact, some 
courts assume a duty once an attorney–client relationship is established.  See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, 
N.A. v. Ferretti, 935 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“The elements of a legal malpractice action, 
sounding in negligence, include: (1) employment of the attorney or their basis for a duty . . . .”). 
36. See RONALD MALLEN, JEFFREY SMITH & ALLISON RHODES, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
§ 37.24 (2014) (“[E]xpert testimony is usually mandatory to prove negligence.”). 
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(2)(c) (2000) (providing 
that a rule of conduct “may be considered by a trier of fact as an aid in understanding and applying 
the standard of” care). 
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attorney can be liable for malpractice even in the absence of an ethics 
breach, and thus our analysis here will also explore whether the attorney 
exercised “the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in 
similar circumstances.”38 
It is clear that the attorney in each of our examples violated the duty of 
care.  The attorney in A has violated RPC 1.13 and a host of other ethical 
rules.  Model Rule 1.13 is undoubtedly designed to protect the client 
against precisely the harm that eventuated: attorneys are required to report 
to higher authorities to provide the latter with notice and opportunity to 
exercise their legal authority to prevent the wrongdoing.  Moreover, the 
attorney in B has arguably violated RPC 2.1 by failing to inquire further 
before engaging in a transaction with reasonable suspicions of client crime 
or fraud. 
Hypotheticals C and D assume that Roberts failed to act with the care 
that attorneys would typically exhibit in this setting.  Negligence does not 
require knowledge of the client wrongdoing or even willful or reckless 
indifference.  In C, the attorney can be negligent because of her failure to 
consider allegations that would have prompted a reasonable attorney to 
look closer.  The rumor concerned criminal or fraudulent activity that 
would expose the corporation to grave risk.  The effort to probe deeper was 
modest given these risks: if the allegations were valid, substantial harm was 
not only foreseeable; it is overwhelmingly likely if unchecked.39  In D, an 
attorney hired to conduct an internal corporate investigation has a duty to 
conduct that investigation with reasonable care.  Investigations can fail 
because attorneys do not satisfy what I have termed the truth standards 
that should guide their investigation.40  In hypothetical E, it is likewise 
clear that attorney Roberts has breached the duty of care given that she 
knew of or should have known of the wrongdoing and took no action. 
Causation is typically parsed into two elements—“but for” or factual 
cause;41 and “proximate” or legal cause.42  In A, the attorney’s failure to 
report is clearly a “but for” cause of the loss.  Under the Restatement of 
 
38. Id. § 52(1). 
39. See id. § 96 (“[A] lawyer’s duty of care to the organization is not limited to avoidance of 
assisting acts that threaten injury to a client.  A lawyer is also required to act diligently and to exercise 
care by taking steps to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to a client.”). 
40. Kevin H. Michels, Internal Corporate Investigations and the Truth, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 
83, 111–28 (2010). 
41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (2000) (“Conduct is a factual cause of harm 
when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.”). 
42. See id. § 29 (“An actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that 
made the actor’s conduct tortious.”). 
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Torts test of proximate causation, it would appear that the very risks that 
made the conduct a breach of the duty of care, i.e., that failure to advise a 
higher-up would allow the executive to further the harm, have eventuated.  
Under a closely related foreseeability test, the harm was again best 
understood as a proximate cause: it was highly likely that inaction by the 
attorney would result in the harm that eventuated.  The wrongdoing was 
not some surprise that befell the attorney, but the fulfillment of the 
executive’s avowed plans.  In B and C, crime or fraud that harms the 
corporation is the foreseeable result of failure to inquire more deeply before 
furthering a transaction when an attorney suspects a client of crime or 
fraud, whether willfully blind, reckless or unreasonable.  Likewise, in D, it 
is hard to imagine a more direct consequence of negligent failure to descry 
ongoing wrongdoing then the harms resulting from the undiscovered 
wrongdoing. 
As implied by the causation analysis above, the corporation will also be 
able to satisfy the damages element of a prima facie malpractice claim.  In 
Part V, subsection C below, we will ask whether comparative negligence 
principles should reduce the corporation’s recovery.  
Thus, it appears that the plaintiff corporation (in hypotheticals A 
through D) has a strong prima facie claim against its own attorney for 
malpractice.  The analysis, however, is complicated by the fact that the 
corporation’s own executive engaged in the wrongdoing.  Should that fact 
affect the corporation’s right of recovery against its attorney?  We turn to 
that question next. 
III.     THE IN PARI DELICTO DEFENSE 
A. The Defense and Its Rationale 
As its Latin name implies, the in pari delicto defense addresses the 
concern that a plaintiff who seeks recovery engaged in wrongdoing of his 
own.  Although the doctrine can be characterized in a variety of ways, it 
generally provides that the plaintiff cannot recover from a defendant if the 
plaintiff bears equal or greater fault for the wrongdoing that lead to the 
claim.43  Some courts have characterized the wrongdoing that would 
invalidate the plaintiff’s claim more narrowly, allowing the in pari delicto 
 
43. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985) (“The 
defense is grounded on two premises: first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediating 
disputes among wrongdoers; and second, that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an 
effective means of deterring illegality.”). 
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defense, for example, when the plaintiff’s losses “are substantially caused by 
activities the law forbade him to engage in.”44  The doctrine is an 
equitable one, and its equitable strains can be heard in centuries-old 
formulations: “no court will lend its aid to a man who grounds his action 
upon an immoral or illegal act.”45  The defense has been embraced by 
both state and federal courts.46  Although the defense was originally an 
equitable one, it is now widely accepted as “a defense in actions at law.”47  
While courts have spoken generally of wrongdoing, it appears that most 
have confined the doctrine’s application to criminal or fraudulent 
behavior.48 
One challenge posed by the in pari delicto doctrine is whether the 
defense should apply when the degree of fault between plaintiff and 
defendant differs.  Justice Story’s famous description bears quotation here:  
And indeed in cases where both parties are in delicto, concurring in an illegal 
act, it does not always follow that they stand in pari delicto; for there may be, 
and often are, very different degrees in their guilt.  One party may act under 
circumstances of oppression, imposition, hardship, undue influence, or great 
inequality of condition or age; so that his guilt may be far less in degree than 
that of his associate in the offen[s]e.  And besides, there may be on the part 
of the court itself a necessity of supporting the public interests or public 
policy in many cases, however reprehensible the acts of the parties may be.49  
Thus, courts traditionally assessed the relative culpability of parties, 
limiting the defense to those instances in which the plaintiff was an equal 
or greater wrongdoer.  In addition, the defense could, in certain instances, 
be abrogated to serve the public interest.50 
In time, however, these limitations have eroded and the defense, in turn, 
has expanded.  As the United States Supreme Court has noted, 
“[n]otwithstanding these traditional limitations, many courts have given 
the in pari delicto defense a broad application to bar actions where 
 
44. Am. Trade Partners, LP v. A–1 Int’l Imp. Enters., Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 273, 276 (E.D. Pa. 
1991). 
45. Fowler v. Scully, 72 Pa. 456, 467 (1872) (quoting sources originating with Holman v. 
Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775)). 
46. See Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 151–52 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]he in pari 
delicto defense has long been woven into the fabric of federal law. . . .  [Massachusetts has] warmly 
embraced [the doctrine]”). 
47. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found. v. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 328 (Pa. 2010). 
48. Id. 
49. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 423 (W.H. Lyon, Jr. ed., 14th ed 1918) (emphasis added). 
50. Id. 
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plaintiffs simply have been involved generally in ‘the same sort of 
wrongdoing’ as defendants.”51  With respect to federal actions, the 
Supreme Court has returned the defense to its original moorings, holding 
that the defense will prevail only if “the plaintiff bears at least substantially 
equal responsibility for the violations he seeks to redress.”52  The Court 
also left room for an exception if enforcement of the securities laws would 
be undermined by the defense.53  The latter exception might be framed 
generally as a “public-interest” exception, asking whether “preclusion of 
the suit would not interfere with the purposes of the underlying law or 
otherwise contravene the public interest.”54 
The rationale for the doctrine is that courts should “not lend aid to 
parties who base their cause of action on their own immoral or illegal 
acts.”55  In one memorable formulation, the court declared that it should 
not be forced to serve as “referee between thieves.”56  There is also concern 
that the wrongdoer will, in a sense, profit from his own wrongdoing if 
allowed to recover damages.57  Courts bar the plaintiff’s claim not because 
the defendant’s actions were justified in any sense, “but rather because the 
plaintiff, being equally wrong, has forfeited any claim to the aid of the 
court.”58  Another basis for the defense is deterrence: “denying judicial 
relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring 
illegality.”59 
B. The Defense and Legal Malpractice 
The courts have applied the in pari delicto defense to dismiss claims of 
clients against their attorneys in a variety of settings.  For example, in 
 
51. Id.; Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 307 (1985) (citing Perma 
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968)); see also Nisselson, 469 F.3d at 152 
(“Over time, however, courts expanded the doctrine’s sweep, deploying it as a basis not dismissing 
suits whenever a plaintiff had played any role—no matter how modest—in the harm-producing 
activity.”). 
52. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 310–11. 
53. See id. (stating that the holding of the Court “would not significantly interfere with the 
effective enforcement of the securities laws and protection of the investing public”). 
54. See Nisselson, 469 F.3d at 152 (characterizing the public-interest exception more generally). 
55. Choquette v. Isacoff, 836 N.E.2d 329, 332 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). 
56. Stone v. Freeman, 82 N.E.2d 571, 572 (N.Y. 1948). 
57. See Robins v. Lasky, 462 N.E.2d 774, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (describing the court’s 
history in refraining from using its judicial power to aid fraudulent practices). 
58. Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, PC, 447 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (“In 
the familiar economic language of the Chicago School, among wrongdoers equally at fault the law 
ought not to redistribute losses caused by the wrong itself, but rather should leave the parties where it 
finds them.”). 
59. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985). 
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Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, PC,60 the client committed perjury in 
testifying about her residency status, allegedly on the advice of counsel.61  
The court barred the client from recovery against her attorney under the in 
pari delicto defense noting that, despite her emotional stress during her 
divorce proceeding, the court “cannot adopt her view that this renders her 
conduct less wrong than that of her lawyers.  If stress provided an excuse 
for perjury, we would do well to abolish the oath and the hypocrisy it 
would foster.”62  The court concluded that the parties were therefore in 
pari delicto.63  The court also rejected the client’s argument that public 
policy warranted an exception to the doctrine, noting that perjury rules 
were not the type of complex ethical dilemmas where the client “could 
follow an attorney’s advice, do wrong[,] and still maintain suit on the basis 
of not being equally at fault.”64 
Likewise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected a claim against counsel 
by a client who suffered damages and possible prosecution for perjuring 
himself, again under the alleged advice of counsel.65  In dismissing the 
complaint under the in pari delicto defense, the court reasoned that the 
public interest did not warrant an exception: “Although the public interest 
is served by discouraging attorney misconduct, it would be inappropriate 
to promote that interest by removing the damage to those who deliberately 
and willfully lie under oath in bankruptcy proceedings.”66  The court 
reasoned that an attorney disciplinary action is the appropriate means to 
address the attorney’s wrongdoing, not an action that will reward the client 
for his own wrongdoing.67  Relying on that reasoning, a Massachusetts 
appellate court reached a similar result in dismissing a client’s claim against 
an attorney who allegedly advised him to commit perjury regarding his 
income and assets in a bankruptcy hearing.68 
The client’s wrongdoing that leads to dismissal of his malpractice claim 
can take a variety of turns, as an Illinois appellate decision makes clear.69  
 
60. Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, PC, 447 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). 
61. Id. at 868. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. See id. (noting that “a law degree does not add to one’s awareness that perjury is immoral”). 
65. Evans v. Cameron, 360 N.W.2d 25, 26–27 (Wis. 1985). 
66. Id. at 29. 
67. Id. 
68. See Choquette v. Isacoff, 836 N.E.2d 329, 335 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (“An ‘attorney’s 
misconduct of advising clients to perform illegal acts should be discouraged by the threat of attorney 
disciplinary action,’ as opposed to clients filing suit against the attorney to recover damages incurred 
due to being caught.” (quoting Evans, 360 N.W.2d at 29)). 
69. Robins v. Lasky, 462 N.E.2d 774, 775–76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
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The plaintiff alleged that, on the advice of his attorney, he moved to 
Florida to escape service of process in Illinois, at great financial and 
emotional cost.70  The plan proved unavailing, the advice negligent, and 
the client was served in the action.  The court dismissed the client’s claims, 
describing the client’s decision as an “admitted attempt to evade the law” 
and thus “wrongful conduct.”71 
Our next question is how the in pari delicto should fare in the situation 
presented here—the failed internal gatekeeper.  On the one hand, there is 
obvious similarity between the instances cited above and the internal-
gatekeeping role: both involve attorney wrongdoing and the wrongdoing 
of another actor.  The executive wrongdoer in our gatekeeping scenario is 
not the party seeking redress for the attorney’s malpractice, however.  
Should this change the analysis?  We turn to this next. 
C. The Defense and the Corporate Client 
As discussed, in the legal practice setting, the in pari delicto defense asks 
whether the client’s wrong should bar her recovery against the attorney.  
The attorney in our gatekeeping scenarios represents the corporation, not 
the executive who directed and facilitated the wrongful acts.72  Moreover, 
in our scenarios, the corporation or its successors, not the executive, seeks 
recovery against the attorney in the malpractice action.  Thus, a critical 
question in the internal-gatekeeping scenario is whether the actions of the 
executive should be imputed to the corporation.73  The practical upshot of 
such imputation is that the corporation, as the wrongful actor, would be 
barred from recovery against the attorney under the in pari delicto defense.  
In this section, we will consider the approaches of courts that have 
imputed the executive behavior to the corporation and those that deemed 
imputation inappropriate.  The discussion that follows seeks to sketch 
some of the main approaches; it is intended to be more illustrative than 
exhaustive.74 
 
70. Id. at 775–79. 
71. See id. at 779 (describing the behavior as “unclean hands”). 
72. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2013) (noting that the attorney 
represents the organization and not its constituents). 
73. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found. 
v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 333 (Pa. 2010) (“[A]s is often the case, agency law 
plays a pivotal role in the defense’s practical availability.”). 
74. For example, in order to focus the inquiry, this section will not consider the sole-actor 
doctrine, which imputes knowledge of the agent to the company, even when the agent acts adversely 
to the corporation when the agent dominates the entity or is the sole person who can act on its 
behalf.  E.g., In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d 681, 695 (Nev. 2011) (distinguishing between 
an agent acting either on his own behalf or on the corporation’s). 
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Courts are often called to consider the in pari delicto defense in 
connection with corporation claims against auditors.  We will consider 
these cases in tandem with those against law firms for two reasons.  First, 
many of the leading decisions on the in pari delicto defense involve auditors 
rather than attorneys, as the following discussion will make clear.  Second, 
courts have readily applied the analysis developed in the auditor setting to 
claims against attorneys as well.  Although courts have not emphasized the 
distinction between the attorney and auditor roles, Part V will draw on the 
distinctive obligations of attorneys in assessing the applicability of the 
defense corporate claims against counsel. 
1. Imputation Absent an “Adverse Interest” 
 Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman75 is an early and seminal case76 
on the question of whether a defendant professional could “use the 
wrongdoing of plaintiff’s managers” as a defense against charges of breach 
of contract, malpractice, and fraud.77  Employees of Cenco had engaged 
in a massive fraud that involved its senior management, including the 
chairman and president, along with vice-presidents and other top 
managers.78  The fraud, which was not discovered by its independent 
auditors, involved the inflation of inventories in Cenco’s Medical/Health 
Division far above their actual value.79  This greatly increased the market 
price of Cenco’s stock, allowing Cenco to purchase other companies less 
expensively, borrow money at lower rates, and receive inflated inventory 
values from its insurers for claims for inventory that was lost or 
destroyed.80  When the fraud was discovered, purchasers of Cenco’s 
inflated stock and the corporation itself brought claims against a variety of 
defendants, including the auditors.81 
In determining whether the trial judge gave an erroneous instruction to 
the jury about whether the auditor could use the wrongdoing of Cenco’s 
managers as a defense against the charges of breach of contract, 
professional malpractice and fraud, Judge Posner first rejected what it 
 
75. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982). 
76. See PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 989 A.2d at 331 (characterizing the decision in Cenco as 
“pioneering” and describing its influence). 
77. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 453. 
78. Id. at  451. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id.  For the purposes of this Article, we are concerned with the corporation’s claim against 
the auditors, and the auditors’ invocation of a defense grounded on the wrongdoing of the 
corporation’s executives. 
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characterized as “one extreme position on this question”—that the 
employee’s fraud is always attributed to the corporation by the principle of 
respondeat superior.82  With no controlling precedent, the court looked to 
the “underlying objectives of tort liability” and determined that the 
beneficiaries of a judgment against the auditors would be the stockholders 
of Cenco.83  The court characterized this outcome as “perverse” because 
the stockholders included the corrupt officers, those who elected the board 
of directors who oversaw Cenco during the fraud, and the plaintiff class to 
whom the auditors had already paid $3.5 million to as part of the 
settlement.84 
The court drew a sharp distinction between “fraud on behalf of a 
corporation” and “fraud against it.”  As the court explained:  
Fraud against the corporation usually hurts just the corporation; the 
stockholders are the principal if not only victims; their equities vis-à-vis a 
careless or reckless auditor are therefore strong.  But the stockholders of a 
corporation whose officers commit fraud for the benefit of the corporation 
are beneficiaries of the fraud.  Maybe not net beneficiaries, after the fraud is 
unmasked and the corporation is sued—that is a question of damages, and is 
not before us.  But the primary costs of a fraud on the corporation’s behalf 
are borne not by the stockholders but by outsiders to the corporation, and 
the stockholders should not be allowed to escape all responsibility for such a 
fraud, as they are trying to do in this case.85  
If the executives were engaged in fraud against the corporation, then 
Cenco would not have imputed their wrongdoing to the corporation, and 
the corporation would have a valid claim against the auditors who failed to 
discover the fraud.86  The court concluded, however, that the managers 
were engaged in fraud against third parties, not the corporation itself, and 
 
82. Id. at 454. 
83. Id. at 455. 
84. Id.  
85. Id. at 456. 
86. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982).  In a later case, the 
Seventh Circuit construed the “fraud against the corporation” standard broadly, refusing to impute 
knowledge to the corporation and deprive it of a claim against an auditor in a case where the insiders 
operated an insurance company while insolvent, although elements of “looting” were also arguably 
present.  In rejecting the auditor’s argument, the court noted, “More colloquially put, if defendants’ 
position were accepted, the possession of such ‘friends’ as Reserve had would certainly obviate the 
need for enemies.”  Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1983).  The court also offered 
a narrow reading of Cenco, suggesting that, even if the fraud were directed at third parties, Cenco 
would impute knowledge to the corporation only if the plaintiff corporation would properly 
compensate the victims of the wrongdoing, and such recovery would deter future wrongdoing.  Id. 
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that imputation was not justified.87  The court noted that the board of 
directors was comprised of some members who were dishonest and others 
who were careless, which made their failure to detect to fraud both “hard 
to condone[,]” and that coupled with the scale of the fraud and number of 
high ranking managers involved, warranted imposition of responsibility on 
the corporation for the fraud that the auditor failed to detect.88  The court 
also noted that allowing the corporation to recover against the auditor 
would reduce the “incentives to hire honest managers and monitor their 
behavior.”89 
Although Cenco’s imputation of knowledge from the executives to the 
corporation appears to have been influenced at least in part by the unique 
circumstance that shareholders who were involved in the fraud might 
benefit by allowing a claim against a failed auditor,90 its holding has 
persuaded courts to impute knowledge more categorically.91  Relying on 
Cenco, the Second Circuit reached a more sweeping result in Kirschner v. 
KPMG LLP.92  In that case, a corporation eventually discovered and 
disclosed that the President and CEO had, over a period of years, arranged 
for hundreds of millions of dollars in loans that camouflaged the 
company’s uncollectable debt and created a false picture of the company’s 
finances, eventually leading to its bankruptcy.93  The trustee appointed to 
advance the corporation’s claims arising prior to bankruptcy filed an action 
against the attorneys and auditors for malpractice in failure to discover the 
wrongdoing.94  The defendants interposed an in pari delicto defense.95 
A central question in the case was whether the wrongdoing of the 
 
87. Schact, 711 F.2d at 1348–49. 
88. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456. 
89. Id.  
90. Id. at 455–56. 
91. See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 826 (Del. Ch. 2009) (characterizing Cenco as 
“based on the notion that immunizing auditors from malpractice claims, even in situations where the 
auditor’s compliance with professional standards might have helped catch the fraud and limit the 
harm to the corporation, is good policy because it incentivizes independent directors and even 
stockholders to be effective monitors of managerial behavior”).  American International is especially 
interesting because, in applying New York law, it was constrained to dismiss the malpractice claims of 
the corporation against its auditor under the categorical imputation approach of KPMG and its 
progeny, which it noted “does not necessarily reflect the outcome that would be reached if Delaware 
[law] applied.”  Id. at 828; see also Kirschner v. KPMG LLP., 938 N.E.2d 941, 951 (N.Y. 2010) 
(noting that the New York court has “held for over a century that all corporate acts—including 
fraudulent ones—are subject to the presumption of imputation . . . [a]nd, as with pari delicto, there 
are strong considerations of public policy underlying this precedent . . . .”). 
92. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941 (N.Y. 2010). 
93. Id. at 945. 
94. Id. at 946. 
95. Id. at 949. 
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executive should be imputed to the corporation.96  If so, the court 
reasoned, then the corporation would be in pari delicto with the 
professional defendants, and its claim should be barred.97  The court cited 
a central principal of agency law, that “the acts of agents, and the 
knowledge they acquire while acting within the scope of their authority are 
presumptively imputed to their principals.”98  Because corporations can 
act only through their agents, it should “be responsible for the acts of its 
authorized agents even if particular acts were unauthorized.”99  Agency 
law presumes, moreover, “that agents communicate information to their 
principals,” regardless of whether such communication in fact takes 
place.100  The corporation selects the agent, and therefore should bear the 
risk of loss from the dishonest behavior of the agent, even when the agent 
commits fraud.101 
The KPMG court acknowledged a narrow exception to the general rule 
of imputation—the “adverse-interest” exception.102  When the agent 
“totally abandons” the corporation’s interests and acts “entirely for his own 
or another’s purposes,” then his behavior will not be imputed to the 
corporation.103  The court embraced Cenco’s narrow reading of the 
exception,104 which applies when the executive steals, embezzles from, or 
loots the corporation for his own interests, not when he commits fraud in 
his role as an executive.105  The presumption that an agent will 
communicate with a principal, the court reasoned, loses its force when the 
agent is stealing from his principal.106  Because the executive’s fraud did 
not victimize the corporation, the adverse-interest exception did not apply 
 
96. Id. at 947 (describing the adverse-interest exception and its application to corporate 
officers). 
97. Id. at 949. 
98. Id. at 950. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 951. 
101. Id.  
102. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 952 (N.Y. 2010). 
103. Id.  
104. See id. (highlighting the requirement of adversity between the defrauder’s interests and the 
interests of the corporation). 
105. See id. (“A fraud that by its nature will benefit the corporation is not ‘adverse’ to the 
corporation’s interests, even if it was actually motivated by the agent’s desire for personal gain . . . . 
Thus, ‘[s]hould the ‘agent act[] both for himself and the principal,’ . . . application of the exception 
would be precluded.” (quoting Capital Wireless Corp. v. Deloitte & Touche, 216 A.D.2d 663, 666 
(1995))). 
106. See id. at 951 (“[T]he presumption that agents communicate information to their 
principals . . . governs in every case, except where the corporation is actually the agent’s intended 
victim.”). 
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here.107  The KPMG court dismissed the claims against the professional 
defendants, holding that the acts of the executive were imputed to the 
corporation under agency law, and therefore the corporation’s claims were 
barred by the in pari delicto defense.108  The holding, the court noted, was 
consistent with the centuries-old precedent of imputing the acts of agents 
to the principal, and it incentivized corporations to exercise care in the 
selection of their agents.109 
The sweep of the KPMG decision is indeed striking.  With the 
exception of an executive’s theft from the corporation, the court’s holding 
would effectively insulate attorneys from all liability for failure to report an 
executive’s wrongdoing to higher-ups in the organization.  The 
organization is irrefutably presumed to “know” of such wrongdoing, and 
therefore is deemed responsible for the act regardless of its actual 
knowledge.  With the exception of hypothetical E, none of the 
wrongdoing falls within the adverse-interest exception, since the executives 
were not stealing from the corporation or otherwise advancing only their 
personal interests.110  In each of these hypotheticals, the attorneys would 
be immune from liability for their failings, even if their failings breached 
an ethical obligation to investigate or report the information and even if 
they were expressly retained to investigate alleged wrongdoing.  If attorneys 
have an internal-gatekeeping duty, then, under KPMG, it is one without a 
civil remedy for its breach.111 
For an example of the categorical imputation approach in the law firm 
setting, consider In re Greater Southeast Community Hospital Corp. I.112  
There, a law firm was alleged to have committed malpractice in connection 
with opinion letters it issued that enabled the corporation to obtain 
 
107. Id. at 953. 
108. Id. at 959. 
109. Id. at 951–52. 
110. In theory, the categorical imputation approach would also apply to hypothetical D, where 
the attorney was negligent in conducting an internal investigation into whether the executive was 
engaged in wrongdoing against a third party, since the executive’s wrongdoing was not adverse to the 
corporation.  The outcome is so perverse (the imputation would eliminate the law firm’s liability 
under the in pari delicto defense) that courts have chosen not to apply the imputation rule in these 
circumstances, albeit without explaining why the principles that justify imputation absent an adverse 
interest do not warrant imputation here.  See Kirschner v. K & L Gates, 46 A.3d 737, 745 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2012) (“By negligently conducting is investigation, K&L Gates affirmatively caused harm 
to Le-Nature’s . . . [which] negate[s] the defense of imputation.”). 
111. The attorneys would remain accountable in a disciplinary forum for those ethical 
breaches, provided that the client (or other party with standing) chose to file an ethical grievance.  
112. In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp. I, 353 B.R. 324, 333–34 (Bankr. D.C. 2006). 
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additional financing.113  The corporation trustee alleged that the law firm 
knew or should have known that the statements in the opinion were false, 
and that the corporation relied on those statements in obtaining additional 
financing that deepened its insolvency.114  The court dismissed the 
malpractice claims against the attorney because the fraud of the executives 
was committed on behalf of, rather than against the corporation, and 
therefore the adverse-interest exception did not apply.115 
In the subsections that follow, we will consider two other categories of 
approaches to the in pari delicto defense.  In considering these distinctive 
approaches, it is important to keep in mind that courts generally agree that 
imputation of knowledge of executive wrongdoing to the corporation is 
inappropriate when the executive steals from the corporation for the 
reasons cited in Cenco and KPMG.  The disagreement concerns whether to 
impute knowledge of the executive’s wrongdoing in cases in which the 
executive furthers a crime or a fraud by the corporation against a third 
party in claims by the corporation against those who may have breached 
some duty to discover or report the wrongdoing to the corporation.  
Despite the fact that the fraud was conducted “on behalf” of the 
corporation on a third party,116 the corporation itself can suffer grave 
harms that early gatekeeper discovery could have prevented or reduced.  
KPMG exemplifies the most sweeping or “categorical” approach to the 
imputation question.117  Below we consider two other approaches. 
2. An Additional Exception to Imputation: Bad Faith 
Our question is when the wrongdoing of a rogue executive will be 
imputed to the corporation, thereby providing the failed gatekeeper an in 
pari delicto defense against the corporation’s claim for malpractice.  Here 
 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. See id. at 369 (emphasizing that although the company was “harmed by the artificial 
prolongation of its existence,” it “benefit[ed] to some degree by that same prolongation at the expense 
of innocent third parties”).  Of course, even courts that purport to impute knowledge absent an 
adverse interest, struggle to define the exception.  In BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clifford, 
the law firm allegedly advised senior officials of a bank to engage in an unlawful transaction.  BCCI 
Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clifford, 964 F. Supp. 468, 472–73 (D.D.C. 1997).  Although 
defendants offered arguments to suggest that the officials were acting on behalf of rather than against 
the corporation, the court found the allegations sufficient to deny the law firm’s motion to dismiss.  
Id. at  479–80. 
116. Thus, the question is whether to impute knowledge of executive wrongdoing to others 
when the executives are, in Judge Posner’s memorable phrase, “turning the company into an engine 
of theft against outsiders.”  Cenco, 686 F.2d at 454. 
117. Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 941. 
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we consider an additional exception to imputation where the gatekeeper 
was alleged to be in collusion with the executive. 
In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health 
Education & Research Foundation v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP,118 the 
auditor was alleged to have colluded with the officers of the corporation to 
misstate the financial condition of the entity, “concealing the corporation’s 
deepening insolvency and facilitating management’s continuation of a 
ruinous business strategy while thwarting essential, remedial intervention 
by the board of trustees.”119  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
acknowledged that, in some instances, the in pari delicto defense could be 
validly interposed by an auditor in a claim by the corporation for 
malpractice.120  The court stated that, as a general matter, the executive’s 
wrongdoing should be imputed to the corporation, and the in pari delicto 
defense should therefore apply, when the auditor is negligent.121  The 
court reasoned that imputation in this instance “gives appropriate 
recognition to the fact that it is the principal who has empowered the 
agent.”122  The court also noted that the “outrageous” behavior of the 
executives “should have a legitimate place in the negligence case” against 
the auditor.123 
The court concluded, however, that imputation would not be 
appropriate when the auditor and the corporation collude.124  The 
corporation should not be charged with knowledge of its executives’ 
wrongdoing against a third party that “actively and intentionally” 
prevented those in the corporation’s “governing structure who were non-
participants in the fraud from acquiring such knowledge.”125  The court 
also noted that the assumption that agents will share information with the 
principal does not apply when the executive and third party work actively 
to conceal information from the principal.126  Thus, when the auditor 
engages in secretive, collusive behavior with the executive, it will not 
receive the benefit of the in pari delicto defense.127 
 
 118. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found. v. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313 (Pa. 2010). 
119. Id. at 315. 
120. Id. at 331. 
121. Id. at 335. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 336. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 337. 
127. See BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clifford, 964 F. Supp. 468, 480 (D.D.C. 
1997) (refusing to apply the imputation doctrine to shield defendants from liability where plaintiffs 
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In BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clifford,128 the court relied on 
a bad-faith analysis in refusing to impute knowledge of executive’s criminal 
wrongdoing to the corporation when the law firm was alleged to be 
complicit in the wrongdoing.129  The court reasoned that imputation 
“may not be invoked where third persons use the agent to further their 
own frauds upon the principal”130 because imputation would in that 
instance “shield” the law firm from the consequences of its own fraud.131 
In Kirschner v. K & L Gates,132 the district court considered a 
complaint against a law firm that was retained by a special committee of 
the board of directors to investigate allegations by three senior managers 
who resigned.133  The managers alleged that the CEO had and continued 
to engage in fraud in connection with the company’s financial 
statements.134  The law firm found no evidence of malfeasance by the 
CEO, a report relied on by the special committee.135  The complaint 
alleged that the law firm “failed to uncover the massive fraud being 
perpetrated by [the CEO,]” and that the CEO and others were able to 
continue to “loot” the corporation, “incurring further corporate debt and 
wasting corporate funds on avoidable transactions.”136  Among other 
failings, the law firm allegedly allowed the CEO, the alleged wrongdoer, to 
“dictate and limit the manner in which the investigation was 
conducted.”137  After more expenditure by the CEO, the company 
eventually sought relief in bankruptcy court, and the trustee sought relief 
on behalf of the corporation contending, inter alia, claims of malpractice, 
breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation against the 
firm.138 
The court acknowledged that Alleghany would require imputation of the 
executive’s wrongdoing to the corporation in cases of negligence.139  It 
 
alleged that corporate officials’ and attorneys’ collusion lead to the corporation’s demise). 
128. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clifford, 964 F. Supp. 468 (D.D.C. 1997). 
129. Id. at 479–80. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Kirschner v. K & L Gates LLP, 46 A.3d 737 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
133. Id. at 742. 
134. Id. at 741. 
135. Id. at 744–45. 
136. Id. at 745. 
137. Id. at 756; see also Kevin H. Michels, Internal Corporate Investigations and the Truth, 40 
SETON HALL L. REV. 83, 103–04 (2010) (discussing the duties of investigative counsel to develop an 
accurate account, and the means by which such account should be pursued by investigative counsel). 
138. Kirschner, 46 A.3d at 746–47. 
139. Id. at 764. 
8 MICHELS_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:21 AM 
346 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 4:318 
concluded, however, that the allegations satisfied the two instances in 
which Alleghany nonetheless allows liability—bad faith and executive acts 
that were not designed to benefit the corporation.140  With respect to the 
former, the court offers scant analysis of why the law firm’s failings amount 
to bad faith rather than negligence, other than to cite plaintiff’s averments 
to that effect.141  With respect to the second, the court offers little 
explanation of why and when the alleged wrongdoing of the executive 
would satisfy the seemingly narrow exception for adverse-interest offered 
by Cenco and KPMG and seemingly embraced by Alleghany.142  The court 
stated simply that, “we cannot conclude that a material misstatement of 
corporate financial information, so as to hide [the CEO’s] looting of the 
company, provided any benefit to [the corporation].”143  Given 
Alleghany’s statement that benefit to the corporation would, as in Cenco, 
be construed “liberally,” the K & L Gates decision seems to strain 
application of the rule.  Perhaps K & L Gates reflects the court’s discomfort 
with the straightjacket of an imputation rule that would immunize 
negligent gatekeepers whose failings prevent boards from performing their 
oversight role.  As we will discuss in Part V, the K & L Gates court might 
have considered the significance of the fact that the law firm was expressly 
retained to investigate the wrongdoing in question. 
     The Restatement Third of Agency has spawned some controversy over 
its handling of the imputation question as applied to gatekeepers.  Section 
5.03 restates the longstanding principle that notice of the agent’s acts are 
imputed to the principal, and Section 5.04 restates the adverse-interest 
exception, requiring—again, as long understood—that the agent act 
“solely” for his (or another’s) benefit in order to trigger the exception.  
Section 5.04 adds a new exception “to protect the rights of a third party 
who dealt with the principal in good faith.”144  The Section provides 
 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. See Kirschner v. K & L Gates LLP, 46 A.3d 737, 764 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (relying on 
Allegheny without directly addressing the narrow exception for adverse interest). 
143. Id. 
144. Section 5.04 of the Restatement Third Agency provides:   
For purposes of determining a principal's legal relations with a third party, notice of a fact that 
an agent knows or has reason to know is not imputed to the principal if the agent acts adversely 
to the principal in a transaction or matter, intending to act solely for the agent’s own purposes 
or those of another person.  Nevertheless, notice is imputed (a) when necessary to protect the 
rights of a third party who dealt with the principal in good faith; or (b) when the principal has 
ratified or knowingly retained a benefit from the agent’s action.  A third party who deals with a 
principal through an agent, knowing or having reason to know that the agent acts adversely to 
the principal, does not deal in good faith for this purpose.   
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further that a third party “knowing or having reason to know that the 
agent acts adversely to the principal, does not deal in good faith.”145  As 
Mark Loewenstein observes, the provision’s context suggests that we read 
the good faith exception as “an exception to an exception,” meaning that 
the presence or absence of good faith by a third party matters only when 
the agent is acting solely to benefit himself (or another).146  The adverse-
interest exception is rarely satisfied because corporate wrongdoers seldom 
act “solely” for their own interests.  As a result, this interpretation would 
rarely change the analysis in gatekeeper failure cases.147   
     Were it only that simple.  The Restatement Third offers a curious 
interpretation of Section 5.04 in Illustration 5.  In the Illustration, A, an 
agent of the corporation (CFO), withholds material information from 
auditor T who certifies incorrect financial statements even though he 
“knows or has reason to know” that the information was withheld.  In a 
claim by the corporation against T for losses resulting from the faulty 
financial statements, knowledge of A’s fraud will not be imputed to the 
corporation because T did not act in good faith.  The Illustration is 
confusing because nowhere does it state that A was acting “solely in his 
interest” in withholding information from T, thus calling into question the 
limited reading of the good faith exception offered in the paragraph above.  
Does Illustration 5 propose a new exception to imputation, applicable 
generally and not only when the agent has an adverse interest?  If so, why 
would such a profoundly new doctrine be offered as an illustration rather 
than in the statement of the rule set forth in Section 5.04, which by its 
terms addresses only the adverse interest exception?  Loewenstein considers 
these and other anomalies posed by Illustration 5, concluding that the 
drafters of the Third Restatement intended to create a new exception to 
imputation and used the good faith exception and Illustration 5 to do so 
after failed attempts to broaden the adverse-interest exception.148   After a 
careful study of the ALI’s deliberations and the language proposed and 
adopted, Loewenstein characterized the change as “a stealth attempt to 
significantly alter the imputation doctrine as it existed for many, many 
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 (2006). 
145. Id.  
146. Mark J. Loewenstein, Imputation, The Adverse Interest Exception, and the Curious Case of 
the Restatement (Third) of Agency, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 305, 341–42 (2013). 
147. Id.  
148. Id. at 340–47.  Professor Loewenstein traces the American Law Institute discussions that 
lead to adoption of this change, citing concerns about the interests, albeit disclosed, of those who 
encouraged the change.  Id. at 330–40.   
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years with no acknowledgment that such an alteration was taking place or 
why.”149  
If Section 5.04 and Illustration 5 intended to create a new imputation 
exception, then the next question is how to interpret its “know or reason to 
know” standard.  Does this suggest that imputation would be 
inappropriate when a gatekeeper is negligent, or is something akin to 
recklessness on the part of the gatekeeper required to trigger exception?  
The Restatement comments offer no elaboration.150 
3. No Imputation for Negligence 
Other courts, evaluating the culpability of professionals alleged to have 
failed in their gatekeeping role, have rejected the traditional imputation 
analysis in determining whether the executive’s culpability should be 
ascribed to the corporate client for purposes of the in pari delicto defense.  
In NCP Litigation Trust v. KPMG LLP,151 two executives intentionally 
provided false information to the company’s auditors, who did not 
discover the misstatements for “several years.”152  When subsequent audits 
uncovered the fraud and tens of millions of dollars in losses, the 
corporation reported the misstatements and declared bankruptcy.153  A 
trustee, appointed to pursue the interests of the corporation—as its 
successor interest—and shareholders, brought a negligence claim against 
the auditors, which raised the in pari delicto defense.154  The trial court 
applied a standard agency analysis, imputing the wrongdoing of the 
executives to the corporation, and holding therefore that the corporation 
and the auditors were in pari delicto, dismissing the case against the 
auditors.155 
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that knowledge of the wrongdoing 
of the executives should not be imputed to the corporation for purposes of 
the in pari delicto defense.156  The court began by acknowledging that, 
under agency law, the knowledge of the agent—in this case, the 
executives—is imputed to the principals—here, the corporation.157  The 
 
149. Id. at 346. 
150. See id. at 344–45 (noting the absence of any explanation in the Restatement comments on 
the elements of the “good faith” standard). 
151. NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871 (N.J. 2006). 
152. Id. at 873. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 879. 
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court discussed three rationales for the imputation rule.158  First, as 
discussed earlier, the rule creates incentives for principals to select agents 
carefully.159  Second, the rule “encourages a principal to develop effective 
procedures for the transmission of material facts, while discouraging 
practices that isolate the principal or co-agents from facts known to an 
agent.”160  Third, the rule encourages third parties to do business with 
agents, because the principal remains ultimately accountable to the third 
party for the agent’s acts and representations.161  At the heart of the 
doctrine is a compelling rationale: principals should not benefit “through 
their agents while avoiding the consequences of agent misdeeds.”162 
The court found those rationales less compelling in considering the 
liability of an auditor who negligently fails to discover the agent’s fraud.163  
The imputation rule, it noted, “operates on an all-or-nothing basis,” either 
allowing or eliminating liability and is insensitive to the demands of 
particular cases.164  Imputation, the court noted, understandably protects 
innocent third parties who are defrauded by the actions of the 
corporation’s executive, by allowing the third party to recover from the 
corporation.165  Here, by contrast, imputation would insulate an auditor 
alleged to have failed to detect the executives’ fraud in breach of its 
contract with, and duty of care to, the corporation.166  The court also 
noted that by rejecting immunity and thereby allowing claims against 
auditors, it was maintaining incentives for the auditors to perform 
 
158. Id. 
159. See id. (“[T]he imputation doctrine ‘creates incentives for a principal to choose agents 
carefully and to use care in delegating functions to them.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006))). 
160. Id. at 871 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 5.03 cmt. b (2006)). 
161. NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 879 (N.J. 2006) (“[T]hird parties who 
are aware that the principal is ultimately accountable for its agent’s actions and representations are 
more likely to conduct business through an agent.”). 
162. Id. at 879 (quoting Andrew J. Morris, Clarifying the Imputation Doctrine: Charging Audit 
Clients with Responsibility for Unauthorized Audit Interference, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 350 
(2001)). 
163. See NCP, 901 A.2d at 879 (reaching the same conclusion as the Appellate Division, but 
refusing to adopt the same equitable fraud rationale). 
164. See id. at 880 (stating that “[imputation] is unforgivably binary” (quoting Andrew J. 
Morris, Clarifying the Imputation Doctrine: Charging Audit Clients with Responsibility for Unauthorized 
Audit Interference, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 353 (2001))). 
165. See id. at 882 (responding to the dissent’s statement that, as a result of the holding, the 
imputation defense will cease to exist). 
165. See id. at 879–80 (reasoning that the imputation defense “in a simple principal–agent 
relationship begins to break down” when applied to a more complex fact scenario involving a 
corporate audit). 
166. Id. 
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properly.167  Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision appears to 
eliminate the in pari delicto defense for the negligent auditor.168 
Some courts have refused to impute the executives’ wrongdoing to the 
corporation in negligence for other reasons.  One approach is the 
“innocent insiders” theory, which does not impute the wrongdoing of the 
executives to the corporation if there was at least one member of corporate 
management without knowledge of the fraud who could have prevented 
it.169  The innocent-insider approach would eliminate imputation in the 
vast majority of claims against failed gatekeepers.  Of course, knowledge of 
the wrongdoing, if sufficiently widespread among management can 
eliminate the need for imputation, since the actual knowledge of the 
corporation would preclude a claim against the failed gatekeeper under an 
in pari delicto defense. 
For example, in an Ohio case, the trustee for the corporation alleged 
malpractice against a law firm for a variety of alleged failings in a 
transaction between the corporate client and an Employee Stock 
Ownership Program (ESOP) to purchase one hundred percent of the 
corporation’s outstanding stock.170  The law firm allegedly failed to advise 
the board that the transaction involved self-dealing, and instead facilitated 
the conflicted transaction.171  The court held that, “[c]orporate counsel 
has a duty to act as gatekeeper, to take appropriate action to advise the 
directors, and to help them avoid wrongdoing that could seriously harm its 
 
167. See id. at 883 (noting that a holding making auditors liable for their negligence would 
encourage them to be more sincere and conscientious in the future).  The court later elaborated on 
this argument in its analysis of the shareholder claims against the corporation, claims that present 
different concerns although none that are central to the analysis here.  Id. at 886–87. 
168. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research 
Found. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 335 (Pa. 2010) (“[W]e read the rationale 
for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in NCP as effectively negating imputation (and thus 
barring the in pari delicto defense) . . . .”). 
169. See Smith ex rel. Estate of Boston Chicken, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 175 F. Supp. 
2d 1180, 1199 (D. Ariz. 2001) (noting that the wrongful act of a corporate actor would not be 
imputed to a corporation if it could allege the existence of one corporate actor who would have 
prevented the fraud if he had been aware of it (citing Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & 
Sheinfeld, 212 B.R. 34, 44–45 (S.D.N.Y. 1997))); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. BDO Seidman, 49 F. 
Supp. 2d 644, 650–51 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing two cases where the courts refused to impute the 
wrongful conduct on the corporation unless all of the managers were involved in the defrauding); see 
also Jonathan Witmer-Rich & Mark Herrmann, Corporate Complicity Claims: Why There Is No 
Innocent Decision-Maker Exception to Imputing an Officer’s Wrongdoing to a Bankrupt Corporation, 74 
TENN. L. REV. 47, 50 (2006) (arguing that the exception is inconsistent with agency law, bad policy 
and not likely to be widely adopted by courts). 
170. Antioch Litig. Trust v. McDermott Will & Emery LLP, 738 F. Supp. 2d 758, 770–71 
(S.D. Ohio 2010). 
171. Id. at 771. 
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corporate client.”172  The court rejected the law firm’s in pari delicto 
defense partly on the grounds that it was not clear from the pleadings that 
the self-interested directors dominated the board, therefore warranting 
imputation of their action to the entity.173  The court also noted that the 
pleadings did not allege that the corporation had equal or greater 
culpability than the law firm.174 
IV.     IMPUTATION AND GATEKEEPING: COMPETING RATIONALES 
A. Introduction 
The question, let us recall, is when should law firms that fail in the 
internal-gatekeeper role be allowed to interpose an in pari delicto defense to 
a corporate client claim for malpractice.  For many courts, the question 
quickly devolves into an analysis of whether to “impute” the wrongdoing 
or its knowledge to the corporation under agency principles.  If the 
corporation is deemed the wrongdoer or is deemed to be aware of the 
wrongdoing—i.e., if the wrongdoing is imputed to the corporation—then 
the corporation is equal or more culpable than the lawyer and therefore the 
lawyer should have the benefit of the in pari delicto defense.  It is difficult 
to imagine more varied and inconsonant judicial approaches to the 
problem than those we have considered—imputation in the absence of an 
adverse interest, bad-faith imputation, and the rejection of imputation in 
cases of negligence.  In this Part, the goal is not to assess the relative merits 
of these approaches, but to take a closer look at the reasons for imputing 
executive wrongdoing and its knowledge to the corporation, as well as the 
tensions posed by these goals and the gatekeeping role of the attorney.  
This will set the stage for my attempt to reconcile these divergent goals 
into a new imputation exception in Part V. 
At first blush, agency law certainly seems relevant to an in pari delicto 
defense: it explores the bases for attributing “the legal consequences of one 
person’s [action] to . . . another person.”175  Because the in pari delicto 
defense asks us to compare culpability between the corporation and the 
failed gatekeeper, it is tempting to look to the attribution principles of 
agency law to determine whether the corporation should be attributed 
blame.  We will begin by examining agency’s law attribution of liability 
 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 772–73. 
174. Id. at 773. 
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY intro note (2006). 
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from agent to principal, asking whether it bears on the imputation 
question posed by the in pari delicto defense in our examples.  Next, we 
will examine agency law’s imputation of knowledge from agent to principal, 
again exploring its relevance for our question. 
B. Imputation of Liability 
The Restatement Third of Agency distinguishes between the “direct” 
and “vicarious” liability of a principal for the actions of an agent.176  
Direct liability can be imposed on the principal who grants “actual 
authority” to an agent to engage in the wrongful behavior.177  The 
imputation questions posed by our scenarios do not implicate actual 
authority because the board of directors had no knowledge of the 
executive’s plans, and therefore did not manifest to the agent that it desired 
the agent to undertake the wrongful acts.178  Vicarious liability, however, 
turns not on the principal’s authorization of the wrongdoing but on the 
nature of the agent’s role.179  Thus, a principal is vicariously liable for the 
torts of its agents who act on apparent authority180 and for the torts of 
employees acting within the scope of their employment.181  In our 
scenarios, if a third party, such as the patient in Scenario A, who ingested 
the medication and suffered a stroke, brought a claim against the 
corporation, clearly the wrongdoing of the executives would and should be 
attributed to the company under one or both of these vicarious liability 
principles. 
One quite literal objection is that in pari delicto is not concerned with 
whether the principal is liable for the agent’s act, but whether the principal 
should be deemed the criminal or intentional wrongdoer for purposes of 
 
176. See id. § 7.07 cmt. b (2006) (stating that respondeat superior subjects the employer to 
vicarious liability, which is distinct from direct liability). 
177. See id. (recognizing that an employer can be subject to direct liability for the “harm caused 
by the employee’s tortious conduct”). 
178. See id. § 2.01 (“An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action that 
has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the 
principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”). 
179. See id. § 7.08 cmt. b (holding the principal accountable when the third party reasonably 
believes that the agent is acting on behalf of the principal and such belief is traceable to the principal’s 
manifestations). 
180. See id. § 7.08 (“A principal is subject to vicarious liability for a tort committed by an 
agent in dealing or communicating with a third party on or purportedly on behalf of the principal 
when actions taken by the agent with apparent authority constitute the tort or enable the agent to 
conceal its commission.”). 
181. See id. § 7.07 (imposing vicarious liability on an employer for an employee’s torts 
committed “within the scope of employment”). 
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the in pari delicto defense.182  We will explore this form of imputation, 
nonetheless, because KPMG imputes the “act” to the principal on grounds 
similar to those that warrant imputation of liability.183  If the executive’s 
wrongful “act” should be imputed to the corporation for roughly the same 
reasons as liability for the act, then the analysis bears directly on the in pari 
delicto defense because the corporation would, in such instance, be more 
culpable than the law firm. 
The question, however, is whether the justifications for vicarious 
liability hold any force in the in pari delicto scenarios at issue here despite 
the KPMG court’s allusion to this theory in support of imputation.  First, 
both forms of vicarious liability presume that the agent has committed a 
tort against the third party.  While the executive in our scenario no doubt 
harmed those who consumed the medication, the attorney in our 
hypotheticals is a victim and is not seeking to impose liability on the 
corporation for the wrong committed against him by the agent.  In fact, 
the claim here runs the other way, from principal to attorney.  Thus, it 
may simply be a category error to suggest that the vicarious liability 
theories of agency law should inform our analysis of the in pari delicto 
defense. 
Vicarious liability under the apparent-authority doctrine derives from 
the behavior of the principal in creating the manifestation of apparent 
authority: if the principal creates a reasonable belief in a third party that 
the agent is authorized to act on behalf of the principal, then the principal 
should be liable for the agent’s actions.184  Liability is extended to the 
principal regardless of the agent’s motivations or whether the agent’s acts 
are “beneficial” to the principal—in large part because the principal is 
responsible for creating a reasonable belief in the third party that the agent 
is acting with the principal’s authorization.185  The rationale sheds no 
light on the in pari delicto question posed by our scenario: unlike the arms-
length third party, the lawyer has not relied on or taken action because of 
the agent’s apparent authority.186 
 
182. See Antioch Litig. Trust v. McDermott Will & Emery LLP, 738 F. Supp. 2d 758, 772–73 
(S.D. Ohio 2010) (explaining the applicability of the in pari delicto doctrine). 
183. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010) (“A corporation must, 
therefore, be responsible for the acts of its authorized agents even if particular acts were 
unauthorized.”). 
184. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. b (2006) (basing liability on a 
principal’s manifestations towards a third party). 
185. See id. (reasoning that a principal’s control over a third party’s perception justifies the 
imposition of liability). 
186. See id. § 2.03 cmt. d (“Some transactions by their nature should strike a dissonant chord 
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Respondeat superior is premised in part on the notion that the 
“employer’s ability to exercise control over its employees’ work-related 
conduct enables the employer to take measures to reduce the incidence of 
tortious conduct.”187  Thus, one goal is to create employer incentives for 
supervision beyond those already provided by the direct action against an 
employer.  The rationale has force in our in pari delicto scenarios, provided 
that we are mindful of the countervailing concern: one important method 
of control that the employer exercises over the executive is the corporate 
attorney who fulfills her gatekeeping role by discovering and reporting 
executive wrongdoing.  Another justification for respondeat superior is the 
simple fairness of holding an employer accountable for the harm caused to 
third parties by an employee, whose actions—by definition—the employer 
could control.188  This relates closely to the equitable notion that other 
authorities have cited in support of the respondeat superior rule: if the 
employer can benefit through the actions of its employees, it ought also be 
responsible for their wrongful actions.189  The rationale does strike a 
strong normative chord: those who empower others to act on their behalf 
should bear the benefits and burdens of that choice.  While this rationale 
appears most compelling when an executive harms a third party in the 
corporation’s name, it retains at least some force in the in pari delicto 
setting as well.  
C. Imputation of Knowledge Under Agency Law 
Agency law is not concerned only with the imposition of liability on the 
principal.  It also imputes the agent’s knowledge to the principal on matters 
material to the agent’s role.190  The imputation of knowledge would 
 
for a reasonable third party, given the situation in which an agent has been placed, the nature of the 
principal or its activities, or what the third party knows of the agent’s position within an 
organization.  A basic circumstance is whether the transaction is itself legal.”). 
187. Id. § 7.07 cmt. b (2006). 
188. See id. (differentiating acts that are subject to the principal’s control from those that are 
not). 
189. One traditional rationale for these attributions of liability is that the corporation can act 
only through its agents, and therefore the corporation should be deemed responsible for these actions 
even if they are not authorized.  See, e.g., Lee v. Pittsburgh Coal & Min. Co., 56 How. Prac. 373, 
375 (Super. Ct.1877), aff’d 75 N.Y. 601 (1878) (holding a company liable for a contract and sale 
made through its “agents of natural persons . . . deemed to be clothed with all the powers and 
authority necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of their creation”). 
190. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006) (“For purposes of determining a 
principal’s legal relations with a third party, notice of a fact that an agent knows or has reason to 
know is imputed to the principal if knowledge of the fact is material to the agent’s duties to the 
principal, unless the agent (a) acts adversely to the principal as stated in § 5.04, or (b) is subject to a 
duty to another not to disclose the fact to the principal.”). 
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appear to be more closely akin to the issues implicated by the in pari delicto 
defense: if the corporation should be ascribed knowledge of the executive’s 
wrongdoing in our scenarios, then clearly the attorney is less culpable than 
the corporation, whose executive engaged in fraudulent or criminal 
behavior.  As discussed earlier, courts that have imputed knowledge from 
the executive to corporation for purposes of the in pari delicto defense have 
relied, at least in part, on the knowledge-imputation principle. 
A critical threshold question is whether the imputation standard under 
agency law applies to the in pari delicto scenarios addressed in the 
hypotheticals.  The Restatement imputes knowledge from agent to 
principal “[f]or purposes of determining a principal’s legal relations with a 
third party” except when the agent “acts adversely to the principal.”191  
This would appear to justify imputation in all of the hypotheticals in Part I 
other than when the executive steals from the corporation,192 as some 
courts have found.193  We must proceed with caution, however.  The 
lawyer is not the archetypical “third party” contemplated by the 
imputation doctrine—for example, the consumer of the medicine 
described in our example.  Unlike the traditional third party, the lawyer 
has not been harmed by the corporation or its agent.  The distinction 
between the “third party” contemplated by the Restatement and the lawyer 
becomes more pronounced when we examine one important rationale for 
the knowledge imputation rule in the in pari delicto setting.  We impute 
knowledge from the agent to the principal in part because the agent has a 
duty to keep the principal informed.194  The lawyer in our examples is not 
only a “third party,” she is an additional agent of the corporation with 
reporting duties of her own.195 
Another rationale for knowledge imputation stems from the simple 
 
191. Id. 
192. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982) (considering 
circumstances where the executives engaged in fraud against the corporation). 
193. See the previous discussion of imputation absent an adverse interest in Part III subsection 
C.1. 
194. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) (noting that one reason to 
impute knowledge to principal is that “[a]n agent . . . has a duty, unless otherwise agreed, to use 
reasonable effort to transmit material facts to the principal or to coagents designated by the 
principal”). 
195. See id. § 1.01 cmt. c. (stating that a lawyer-client relationship is an agency relationship). 
The attorney, just like the corporation’s other agents, must “act on the principal’s behalf and subject 
to the principal’s control,” according to the Restatement’s definition of agency.  See id. § 1.01 
(defining agency relationship as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) 
manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and 
subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”). 
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justice of holding a principal responsible for the information on which its 
agent acts.  At the Restatement reasons:  
A principal’s agents link the principal to the external world for purposes of 
taking action, including the acquisition of facts material to their work for the 
principal.  An agent undertakes to act on behalf of a principal; at the time 
the agent determines how to act, facts known to the agent at the time should 
guide the agent’s determination of what action to take, if any.196  
This rationale parallels the rationale for imputing liability to the 
principal discussed earlier.197  The justification hints at a strong normative 
intuition: the principal who seeks to benefit from the agent’s information 
gathering (and actions based on that information) cannot insulate himself 
from the burden of that knowledge.198  For convenience, I will call this 
the “benefit–burden” rationale of imputation.  To the extent we visualize 
the lawyer as a “third party” to the corporation-executive relationship, the 
benefit-burden rationale does appear to justify imputation of executive 
wrongdoing to the corporation in its claims against counsel. 
Courts have also favored imputation of knowledge in gatekeeper settings 
in order to encourage principals to select and monitor agents 
effectively.199  The premise is uncontroversial: as the Restatement reasons, 
imputation incentivizes principals to choose effective agent-monitoring 
techniques, and discourages principals from adopting policies that will 
“isolate the principal[s] . . . from facts known [by] agents.”200  Although 
the rationale holds force generally, we cannot ignore the irony of allowing 
this rationale to justify the wholesale rejection of a corporation’s claims 
against their failed lawyer gatekeeper.  The law firm is not only an agent, as 
described above, but also one who in certain instances is ethically and 
statutorily obligated to report information to the principal about the 
behavior of the principal’s executives.  If the corporation’s gatekeeper 
agents are categorically immunized from liability for failure to provide 
information to the corporation, one wonders how effectively the 
corporation could monitor its affairs through its agents—a concern that 
goes well beyond incentive. 
Consider, by way of simple analogy, an executive who does not advise 
 
196. Id. § 5.03 cmt. b. 
197. See supra Part IV. subsection B. n.190–91. 
198. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) (noting, with respect to 
transaction example, that imputation precludes principal from using agent as a “shield”). 
199. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 951–52 (N.Y. 2010) (emphasizing that 
“imputation fosters an incentive for a principal to select honest agents and delegate duties with care”). 
200. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006). 
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the board of critical information about the operations of the company.  In 
a claim against the executive for wrongdoing, the executive, although an 
agent, could not interpose a defense based on imputation of knowledge 
from agent to principal.  If knowledge imputation protected the agent 
from liability to the principal for nondisclosure, the agent’s underlying 
duty to disclose information would be eviscerated.  Corporations hire law 
firms, also agents, with the expectation that the latter will fulfill their 
ethical and statutory duties to report the wrongdoing of their employees, 
often an important part of the corporation’s monitoring mechanism. 
The Restatement acknowledges that in certain instances, imputation 
should not defeat gatekeeper reporting duties:  
A principal may retain a service provider on terms or for tasks that make 
imputation of agents’ knowledge irrelevant to subsequent claims that the 
principal may assert against the service provider.  For example, a principal 
may retain a service provider to assess the accuracy of its financial reporting 
or the adequacy of its internal financial controls or other internal processes, 
such as its processes for reporting and investigating complaints of harassment 
in the workplace.  If the service provider fails to detect or report deficiencies, 
the principal’s claim against the service provider should not be defeated by 
imputing to the principal its agents’ knowledge of deficiencies in the 
processes under scrutiny.201  
The Restatement’s example is helpful, although it stops shy of identifying 
the reason why imputation would not apply here, other than to deem it 
“irrelevant.”202 
The Restatement correctly refuses to impute knowledge when a service 
provider fails to detect or report wrongdoing not because imputation is 
“irrelevant,” but presumably for a more basic, unstated reason.  In a claim 
between the corporation and the failed service provider, imputation may 
be inconsistent with the very reason for which the service provider was 
retained: to descry and report the information in question.203  In a critical 
 
201. Id. 
202. Perhaps a better term would be “inappropriate,” since a principal’s imputed knowledge 
would be quite “relevant” in a subsequent claim against one hired to identify and report such 
knowledge, although we should nonetheless resist such imputation. 
203. Auditors are routinely hired for the purpose of detecting fraud, and Cenco’s imputation of 
knowledge to the corporation when its auditors fail in their express calling is thus especially troubling.  
See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 829 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[I]f auditors are 
employed, as I think is true, in material part because there is the potential that corporate officials may 
misuse their powers and commit acts of financial wrongdoing, immunizing auditors in situations 
when, but for the auditor’s professional negligence, wrongful managerial behavior may have been 
stopped before it resulted in grievous harm relieves the audit firm of any responsibility in one of the 
circumstances when the auditor’s compliance with its professional standard of care is most critical.”). 
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sense, the service provider may have been hired, in part, because the 
corporation will be imputed knowledge of its agent’s wrongdoing in claims 
by third parties.  The service provider’s monitoring role is an important 
means of preventing such wrongdoing and the corporation’s attendant 
liability to third parties associated with such claims.  Even if the attorney 
was not hired expressly to engage in monitoring efforts, an attorney’s 
compliance with the internal-gatekeeping requirements of the ethics rules 
and statutory duties can be an important part of the corporation’s 
monitoring efforts.  Thus, imputation of facts that the attorney was 
obligated to report may well be inappropriate in circumstances in which he 
was expressly or impliedly retained for the purpose of finding and 
reporting such information.204 
Some important distinctions are beginning to emerge from the 
confusion that has enshrouded the in pari delicto defense in the attorney-
gatekeeper setting.  While it is generally sensible to impute knowledge 
from an executive to the corporation when the corporation is sued by a 
third party for wrongdoing furthered by the executive in the corporation’s 
name, the rationales that support such general imputation are less 
compelling in claims between the corporation and an attorney who failed 
in the internal-gatekeeping role.  As discussed, the attorney is not the 
archetypical “third party” harmed by the corporation through its 
executive’s wrongdoing, but an additional agent of the corporation, in 
many circumstances charged with helping to prevent the very wrong in 
question.   
V.     A PROPOSED NEW APPROACH: THE GATEKEEPER-IMPUTATION 
EXCEPTION 
A. The Gatekeeper-Imputation Exception 
As Part IV demonstrates, agency law’s imputation principles offer 
confusing and at times inconsistent guidance for determining when 
 
204. There is an important instance in which imputation of knowledge would be appropriate 
to ground an in pari delicto defense.  As the Restatement notes, “If a principal’s agents fail to disclose 
or misstate material information to a third party who provides services to the principal, the agents’ 
conduct may result in flawed work by the service provider.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 5.03 cmt. b (2006).  Of course, the service provider may or may not be justified in relying on the 
information provided by the agent, especially when circumstances suggest that the agent’s statements 
are less than trustworthy.  If reliance is justified, and the information proves incorrect, it seems fair to 
impute knowledge of the misstatement to the corporation.  This imputed knowledge, in turn, may 
ground the attorney’s in pari delicto defense.  On the other hand, if the reliance is justified, the 
attorney presumably has not committed malpractice in the first place. 
8 MICHELS_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:21 AM 
2014] The Corporate Attorney as “Internal” Gatekeeper 359 
lawyers who have failed in the internal-gatekeeping role should be entitled 
to interpose an in pari delicto defense.  In this Part, we will search for a 
standard that more closely captures the core concerns implicated by the 
defense in the failed attorney gatekeeper setting.  Two caveats before we 
begin: First, while the approach offered below may offer insight on the 
imputation question regardless of the type of gatekeeper, the inquiry that 
follows is directed at the unique concerns implicated by the attorney’s 
gatekeeper role.205  As I will discuss, the standard proposed here derives at 
least in part from the unique role of the attorney, and the reader should 
therefore not assume complete correspondence with non-attorney 
gatekeeping or monitoring roles.  Second, the proposal that follows is 
designed to address the challenges posed by claims for attorney failings in 
the internal-gatekeeping role, and not all corporation malpractice claims 
against counsel in which the in pari delicto defense might apply. 
A threshold question that must be addressed by any proposal for reform 
is whether agency law and its imputation principles should bear at all on 
the in pari delicto defense in the corporate setting.  It is tempting to dismiss 
imputation as inapposite here, on the grounds that imputation is designed 
to hold the corporation responsible for the harms its agents inflict on 
others.206  The corporation or its agents have not harmed the attorneys in 
our scenerios; on the contrary, the attorneys are defendants in corporation 
claims for malpractice.  The attorney, moreover, is an agent of the 
corporation, and “imputation does not furnish a basis on which an agent 
may defend against a claim by the principal.”207  This general notion is 
certainly sensible in the typical claim between principal and agent.  If, for 
example, the attorney fails to advise the client that the client does not have 
to testify in a criminal matter, we would not impute to the client 
knowledge of what the attorney knew or should have known to support a 
defense by the attorney to the client’s malpractice claim.  Thus, why not 
eliminate imputation entirely when corporations sue their attorneys for 
malpractice in failing to discover or report executive wrongdoing?   
 
205. As noted earlier, we have considered cases involving auditors and attorneys to sketch the 
various approaches to imputation in large part because courts have not seen fit to distinguish the 
auditor and attorney roles in evaluating the in pari delicto defense. 
206. For a recent proposal to this effect, see Christine M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and 
the In Pari Delicto Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
275, 337–38 (2012) (“Imputation functions properly to allow third parties to rely on their dealings 
with a principal’s agent.  It is not proper for the task of assigning fault to a corporation when the 
corporation, as a plaintiff, seeks to recover from a third party who harmed it.”). 
207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. b (2006). 
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First, we should be clear about the implications of “no imputation” 
approach: it would effectively eliminate the in pari delicto defense in the 
internal-gatekeeper setting unless the company has actual knowledge of its 
agent’s wrongdoing.208  The in pari delicto defense asks whether the 
plaintiff is guilty of intentional or criminal wrongdoing,209 and absent 
imputation of the wrongful acts or knowledge of the executive (or other 
employee)210 to the corporation, the corporation does not have the 
requisite culpability to trigger an in pari delicto defense in our scenarios.  
The in pari delicto defense is not designed to compare degrees of negligence 
between the plaintiff and the defendant: comparative negligence does that 
already, and if the goal is to provide grounds for dismissal of a case when 
the plaintiff is “equal to more” negligent than the defendant, then modified 
comparative negligence will accomplish precisely that.211  While the 
corporation may itself have engaged in negligence in failing to conduct its 
own monitoring efforts,212 that negligence cannot ground a law firm’s in 
pari delicto defense.  Because the “no imputation” approach would (absent 
actual knowledge by the corporation) eliminate the in pari delicto defense 
when attorneys are sued for failure to detect or report executive 
wrongdoing, we should be confident that imputation serves no valid 
purpose before categorically eliminating it in corporate malpractice claims.    
As discussed earlier, we can distill three reasons for imputing the acts 
and knowledge of executive wrongdoing to the corporation.  First, under 
what I have termed the “benefit–burden” rationale,213 the corporation 
acts and gathers information through its agents, and thus it should be 
 
208. We need not address the delicate questions surrounding when the corporation has 
“actual” knowledge of its executive’s wrongdoing because our concern is with when and whether to 
impute knowledge to the corporation.  For example, while the board of directors’ knowledge of the 
wrongdoing would no doubt constitute “actual” corporation knowledge of the wrongdoing, it is less 
clear whether the knowledge of only one or a few members would suffice for such a finding. 
209. E.g., Gen. Car & Truck Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Lane & Waterman, 557 N.W.2d 274, 279 
(Iowa 1996) (“The culpability element of the {in pari delicto} doctrine requires that the plaintiff has 
been guilty of illegal or fraudulent conduct.” (citing 27A Am.Jur.2d Equity § 132, at 611)). 
210. I will use the terms “executive” and “employee” interchangeably throughout this 
discussion since my proposed standard would apply to both.  
211. See, e.g., 14 MAINE REV. STAT. § 156 (barring plaintiff from recovery if the plaintiff’s 
negligence is equal to or greater than defendant’s).   
212. Christine Shepard attempts to overcome this concern by arguing that “[i]f the 
corporation’s reporting systems are inadequate to the goal of detecting and deterring insider fraud, 
the corporation can fairly be deemed a ‘knowing and substantial participant’ in the fraud.”  Christine 
M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases: A 
New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275, 328–29 (2012).  With the arguable exception of 
willful blindness, however, a corporation’s negligent monitoring is not tantamount to knowledge of 
an executive’s wrongful act.  
213. See supra Part IV. subsection B. n.199. 
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accountable for its agents’ actions and knowledge with respect to claims 
concerning a third party.214  The converse of this rationale also explains 
the adverse-interest exception to imputation: “[I]t makes no sense to 
charge a person with the actions or knowledge of someone purporting to 
act as the person’s agent if the purported agent was not acting at all on that 
person’s behalf.”215  Second, the corporation’s agents have a duty to 
communicate with the principal, and thus we have reason to believe that 
the principal will be informed when the agent is furthering wrongdoing in 
the corporation’s name.216  Again, when the agent is stealing from the 
corporation, we expect the agent not to fulfill this communication duty, 
thus providing a second rationale for the adverse-interest exception.  
Third, imputation will incentivize the corporation to select and monitor its 
employees carefully.217  The question is whether any of these rationales 
warrant imputation in our scenarios. 
Although the first of these reasons for imputation is most compelling 
when the corporation is sued by a third party for the wrongdoing of its 
agents, it retains force in claims between the corporation and the attorney 
for the latter’s failure to discover employee wrongdoing.  As a general 
matter, the corporation, which connects to the world through its agents, 
ought to be attributed to the acts and knowledge of its agents.218  
Although the attorney is an agent of the corporation, her failure concerns 
information about the acts and knowledge of another corporation agent—
in our examples an executive who was hired and controlled by the 
corporation and who benefits the corporation in his agency role.  Thus, 
imputation in this case is categorically distinct from imputation of 
knowledge that is unique to the attorney in the self-incrimination example 
offered above.  
     The second reason, which emphasizes that agents have duties to 
communicate with their principals, applies not only to corporations but 
also to attorneys, who also have duties to communicate with the principal 
under the attorney-ethics rules219 and agency law.220  Thus, if there is 
 
214. Christine M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto Defense in Auditor 
Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275, 328–29 (2012). 
215. Mark J. Loewenstein Imputation, The Adverse Interest Exception, and the Curious Case of 
the Restatement (Third) of Agency, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 305, 317 (2013). 
216. Id.  
217. Id. 
218. Id.  
219. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2013). 
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (2006). 
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reason to assume that executives are communicating with the corporation, 
ipso facto, these reasons also apply to the attorney.  
     The third rationale creates dissonance as well.  If we impute 
information from agents to principals to incentivize the corporation’s 
monitoring efforts, then we cannot ignore the often critical role that 
attorneys play in helping the corporation monitor its affairs.  A board of 
directors has a duty to keep reasonably informed about corporate affairs 
and to implement systems to monitor legal compliance.221  The board of 
directors is not charged with day-to-day involvement in the operation of 
the corporation.  In order to satisfy its monitoring duties, a board must 
establish systems and intermediates through which it can monitor 
corporate affairs.  By way of example, the board may conduct ethics 
seminars, deploy anonymous tip lines, impose internal corporation 
reporting rules for suspected wrongdoing, and retain investigative counsel 
to explore allegations of wrongdoing.  As a structural matter, the board—
distanced from day-to-day operations—can and, in fact, must rely on the 
fulfillment by others of duties to discover and report executive or other 
employee wrongdoing.222  The gatekeeping efforts of lawyers are an 
important means by which the corporation fulfills this monitoring role.  
Thus, even if we are persuaded that the benefit–burden rationale justifies 
imputation in the scenario offered above, we can begin to see the wisdom 
in crafting an exception that acknowledges the gatekeeping role of lawyers.  
The challenge is to frame an imputation rule that recognizes that both the 
corporation and the law firm have responsibilities for preventing executive 
wrongdoing, and that these duties are often intertwined.  
 When the attorney expressly or impliedly assumes corporation 
monitoring responsibilities, there are at least two reasons to question the 
propriety of imputation to the corporation of the knowledge of executive 
wrongdoing.  First, such imputation will essentially eliminate the 
attorney’s liability for failing to fulfill her express or implied duty.  As a 
result, the corporation will not be able to rely on a critical intermediary 
necessary to fulfill its duty of care to monitor the corporation.  Thus, the 
“public-interest” exception223 to the in pari delicto defense warrants an 
 
221. See 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a)(1) (2008) (noting that the duty of care “includes the obligation to 
make, or cause to be made, an inquiry when, but only when, the circumstances would alert a 
reasonable director or officer to the need therefor”). 
222. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, § 3.4 at 129–30 (1986) (describing the 
“monitoring” model). 
223. See  Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 152 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining the public-
interest exception). 
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exception when gatekeepers fail in their monitoring role.  Second, basic 
notions of equitable estoppel militate against imputation.  Although the 
“elements” of equitable estoppel are fluid, “hypocrisy related to factual 
matters from words, conduct, or even silence may result in an equitable 
ban.”224  When a law firm has expressly or impliedly assumed a 
gatekeeping role with respect to a matter, and the corporation reasonably 
relies on counsel’s performance of that role, there is certainly irony if not 
hypocrisy in its seeking to impute knowledge to the corporation of the very 
information the law firm failed to discover or report.  The doctrine of 
equitable estoppel is especially apt here because in pari delicto is itself an 
equitable doctrine.   
 The reasoning leads to the proposed standard, which I will term the 
“gatekeeper imputation” exception.  In malpractice claims by corporations 
against their law firms for failures to discover or report executive 
wrongdoing, courts should impute the acts and knowledge of the executive 
to the corporation subject to the traditional adverse-interest exception and 
a gatekeeper-imputation exception.  The gatekeeper imputation exception 
provides that when the law firm has expressly or impliedly assumed an 
obligation to identify or report employee wrongdoing, then information that 
would have been discovered had the law firm fulfilled that obligation should 
not be imputed to the corporation for purposes of the in pari delicto defense.  If 
either the adverse-interest or the gatekeeper-imputation exception applies, 
then courts should not impute knowledge of executive wrongdoing to the 
corporation for purposes of the defense.   
 A lawyer expressly assumes a gatekeeping role when she agrees to 
undertake an investigation or monitoring role.  The more challenging 
question is when a law firm impliedly takes on such a role.  Given our 
rationales for the gatekeeping exception, it seems that something more 
than the duty of care alone should be required to imply such a duty.225  
Drawing on the estoppel rationale, the law firm must have a strong enough 
obligation to identify and report the wrongdoing, would it amount to 
“hypocrisy” for it to seek to impute knowledge to the corporation of the 
 
224. T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27 
REV. LITIG. 377, 389 (2008).  
225. By way of reminder, our question is not whether a breach of the duty of care would be 
sufficient to ground a malpractice claim, which—of course—it would be if coupled with causation 
and damages.  Our question is whether counsel can interpose an in pari delicto defense to such a 
malpractice claim.  The in pari delicto defense, in turn, will depend on whether the executive’s 
wrongdoing (or knowledge thereof) will be imputed to the corporation, rendering the latter equally 
or more culpable, and therefore warranting dismissal of the malpractice claim.  The gatekeeper 
exception identifies a category of instances in which such imputation would be inappropriate.  
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information it failed to report.  Valid reasons to imply such a duty can be 
derived from certain ethics rules, such as RPC 1.13 or, on my 
interpretation, RPC 2.1, and statutory provisions, (such as the Sarbanes 
Oxley reporting requirements) which require the attorney to undertake 
specific investigation or reporting efforts in carefully delimited instances.  
Conversely, ethics rules that are roughly analogous to the duty of care that 
attaches to all representations, such as the competence and communication 
requirements of RPC 1.1 and RPC 1.4, respectively, should not, standing 
alone, trigger the gatekeeper imputation exception.  Of course, the 
proposed standard does not change the legal theory that grounds the 
corporation’s claim against the law firm, which remains malpractice.  
Instead, the proposal looks to the express or implied commitments of the 
law firm (the latter measured by the law firm’s ethical and statutory 
reporting duties) to determine when to impute knowledge of the 
executive’s wrongdoing to the corporation.   
 The gatekeeper-imputation exception steers a principled path between 
competing goals.  It optimizes the corporation and lawyer’s monitoring 
roles, without abandoning the normative claim that executive acts and 
knowledge should presumptively be imputed to the corporation.  It 
acknowledges that corporations rely on gatekeepers to monitor their own 
executives, and lawyers who undertake such duties, whether expressly or by 
implication, must have incentives to perform properly.  Corporations, in 
turn, should be encouraged to use a variety of monitoring mechanisms to 
prevent executive fraud, and if lawyers are categorically insulated from 
liability for their gatekeeping efforts, then one valuable tool in the 
corporation’s monitoring arsenal is eliminated.226  Even when the lawyer 
is a part the corporation’s monitoring efforts, the corporation retains 
incentives to pursue additional monitoring paths to reduce the risk of 
liability to third parties, and the possible reduction of its claims against the 
attorney on comparative negligence grounds.227   
 In addition, the gatekeeper-imputation exception eliminates the 
anomalies of the current judicial approaches.  While intuitively appealing, 
the bad faith exception for imputation, adopted by some courts228 and 
arguably embraced by the Third Restatement,229 calls for a deeper 
 
226. While attorneys would remain disciplinarily accountable for such ethics breaches, as 
David Luban notes, “aggrieved clients are more interested in obtaining malpractice damages than in 
filing grievances.”  DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 155 (2007). 
227. See infra Part V subsection C. 
228. See supra Part III subsection C.2. 
229. See supra Part III subsection C. n.144–49. 
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explanation of why the in pari delicto defense should no longer apply in 
these circumstances.  When an attorney represents an individual client, the 
bad faith of the lawyer would not eliminate the in pari delicto defense, 
which allows the defense when both plaintiff and defendant are engaged in 
wrongdoing.230  So why should the attorney’s bad faith eliminate the 
defense in the corporate setting?  The answer is that when the attorney 
engages in bad faith with an executive to commit fraud, the attorney is—
by definition—in possession of knowledge of executive wrongdoing that 
should be disclosed to the corporation under Model 1.3(b) and other rules.  
In other words, the attorney in this instance has failed in her implied 
gatekeeping role.  The attorney should not, in such instance, be the 
beneficiary of imputation for the reasons that support the gatekeeper-
imputation standard proposed herein.  
 The gatekeeper-imputation exception also resolves the challenges 
posed by the rejection of imputation in cases of negligence.  As noted 
above, the categorical rejection of imputation disregards the notion that 
corporations should, absent a particularized exception, be charged with 
knowledge of the wrongdoing of the executives they empower to act on 
their behalf.  Moreover, the abandonment of imputation in cases of 
attorney negligence, without a special justification, would undermine the 
equitable notion that grounds the in pari delicto defense in the first place.  
The archetypal in pari delicto defense involves an individual client who 
commits intentional wrongdoing and a negligent attorney.  Thus the 
question is why should we reject the defense categorically when the 
attorney is negligent in working with a corporate agent who committed 
intentional wrongdoing?  The gatekeeper test offers a cabined answer: 
individuals do not expressly or impliedly hire attorneys to monitor 
themselves; corporations do.  Thus, the proposed standard does not 
categorically reject imputation for all instances of attorney negligence; 
instead, the proposed imputation exception attaches when an attorney 
undertakes an express or implied gatekeeping obligation.   
 By directing our inquiry toward the relation of an attorney’s 
gatekeeping role to the corporation’s overall monitoring efforts, the 
gatekeeper-imputation test invites courts to examine the attorney’s failings 
with a discriminating eye.  It distinguishes between types of attorney 
failings in ways that until now have been overlooked.  While negligence 
alone should not be sufficient to eliminate imputation and, as a result, the 
 
230. As noted earlier, one rationale for the defense is that courts do not wish to referee between 
wrongdoers.  See supra Part III. subsection A. n.58. 
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in pari delicto defense, negligence in an express or implied gatekeeping role 
should be.  By looking to the attorney’s ethical and statutory gatekeeping 
roles to determine when an attorney has an implied gatekeeping 
obligation, the proposed test brings nuance to an area of the law that has 
long been characterized by categorical and inconsistent approaches.  The 
next section will consider how these distinctions would play out in practice 
under the proposed test.  
B. The Exception Applied 
To gain some understanding of how the gatekeeper-imputation test 
might apply in concrete circumstances, we will return to the hypotheticals 
set forth in Part I.  The examples will allow us to consider when an 
attorney has expressly or impliedly agreed to a gatekeeping role, and how 
the gatekeeping exception relates to the adverse-interest exception.   
The most obvious instance in which corporations retain lawyers to play 
an important role in monitoring efforts is when they do so expressly.  
Consider Hypothetical D, in which the corporation hired the attorney to 
conduct an internal corporate investigation of alleged, ongoing 
malfeasance by certain of the corporation’s executives.  If the law firm fails 
to uncover such wrongdoing, and such failing is the result of malpractice 
or some greater failing, then we would not impute the knowledge of the 
wrongdoing to the corporation in a claim between the corporation and the 
law firm for such failing.  The law firm was hired expressly for the 
gatekeeping function, and for reasons described earlier, the law firm’s 
negligence in furthering an expressly undertaken gatekeeping role should 
deprive it of the in pari delicto defense.  While this is an instance in which 
it would strain credulity to insulate the law firm from liability, the 
traditional imputation standards—imputation absent an adverse interest—
provide no conceptual room for an exception and would dictate an 
untenable outcome.   
   Of course, a corporation could expressly retain a law firm to perform 
an internal-gatekeeping role even in the absence of reasons to initiate an 
internal investigation.  Thus, while uncommon, the retention agreement 
between the attorney and the law firm could state that the firm is being 
retained to monitor corporate affairs, whether generally or with respect to a 
particular division or certain specified aspects or transactions of the 
business.  In such instance, a law firm that was negligent in its monitoring 
role should not be allowed to interpose the in pari delicto defense for 
failings related to such express undertaking. 
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 Conversely, the parties could limit the law firm’s liability for breaches 
of gatekeeping duties by express agreement.231  An advantage of the 
proposed standard is that it encourages corporations and law firms to 
address in advance whether and to what extent the law firm is expected to 
perform a gatekeeping role.  When the parties agree on this role, there is 
rarely reason for courts not to respect their allocation of responsibility by 
and between themselves.  Essentially, the advance agreement allows the 
corporation to deploy the law firm in furtherance of the corporation’s 
monitoring duties as much or as little as it wishes, provided the retained 
law firm agrees to it.  An agreement to limit the gatekeeping role of the law 
firm should be ratified by the board of directors to lessen the risk that an 
executive bent on wrongdoing might jettison the lawyer’s gatekeeper role 
as a part of his wrongdoing scheme.   
 When the corporation retains a law firm for roles other than internal 
investigations, it often does not direct the law firm to engage in a discovery 
and reporting role in the engagement letter.  For example, a law firm 
might be engaged to handle a transaction or provide counseling services on 
a specific issue or an array of issues.  Given the parties’ silence on the issue, 
courts should, as noted above, look to the source and nature of the 
attorney’s duties to determine whether the attorney has an implied 
gatekeeping function, thereby eliminating the in pari delicto defense.  For 
example, in Hypothetical A, the law firm knew of the executive’s planned 
criminal or fraudulent scheme but did not report this fact to the board of 
directors of the corporation.  Here, the lawyer has breached RPC 1.13(b), 
which expressly obligates the attorney to undertake the internal-
gatekeeping role in this circumstance.232  In addition, under section 307 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,233 an attorney who discovers evidence 
of the company’s “material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary 
duty or similar violation” must report it to the company’s chief legal 
counsel or the chief executive officer and, failing an adequate response, to 
an audit or independent committee of the board of directors or the entire 
board.234  If the reporting attorney fails to receive an “appropriate 
 
231. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h)(1) (2013).  The argument would not 
release the attorney from her ethical and statutory reporting obligations; it would extend only to 
liability for malpractice, which can be adjusted in advance by agreement subject to the conditions set 
forth in RPC 1.8(h)(1).  Id. 
232. See supra Part I. 
233. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) (setting forth rules of professional responsibility for attorneys). 
234. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006); see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 205.2(e) (2010) (defining “evidence of material violation”). 
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response,” he must report higher within the client organization.235  Given 
the ethical and/or statutory reporting obligations on these facts, it is fair to 
conclude that the lawyer had an implied duty to serve as a gatekeeper on 
these facts, and imputation would not be appropriate.  
     Hypothetical B presents a closer question, given the interpretative 
challenges posed by ethics and statutory standards in question.  In B, the 
attorney had reason for suspicion of executive criminal or fraudulent 
wrongdoing but intentionally choose not to ask follow-up questions.  The 
attorney turned a blind eye to the allegations to avoid converting suspicion 
into “knowledge” of wrongdoing and therefore being required to report on 
the executive’s wrongful design.  In this instance, it is clear that the 
attorney did not have the requisite knowledge to trigger a duty to report 
the executive’s wrongdoing to the board of directors under RPC 1.13.  
The attorney’s obligations under Sarbanes-Oxley are triggered when 
counsel “becomes aware of evidence of a material violation” of the 
client.236  If “awareness” under Sarbanes-Oxley is akin to “knowledge”237 
then the attorney’s reporting obligation would not be trigged under the 
statute on these facts.  As discussed earlier, however, the law firm on my 
proposed interpretation has breached the duty of investigation implied by 
RPC 2.1.238  An attorney, on this view, does not exercise independent, 
professional judgment when she willfully ignores information suggesting 
that a transaction she is about to further is criminal or fraudulent.  Once 
again, the ethical breach signals the gatekeeper-imputation exception of the 
 
235. If the attorney does not believe that the response is appropriate, the attorney must then 
report the material violation to the audit committee of the board of directors, to a committee of 
independent directors, or to the entire board of directors.  See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3) (specifying 
when a lawyer shall report to if “an appropriate response within a reasonable time” is not provided).  
The attorney is permitted to, but need not, report beyond the corporation in certain instances.  See 
generally William H. Volz & Vahe Tazian, The Role of Attorneys Under Sarbanes–Oxley: The Qualified 
Legal Compliance Committee as Facilitator of Corporate Integrity, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 439, 443 (2006) 
(devising a structure and procedure for monitoring corporations). 
236. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c) (specifying the procedure for reporting illegality when the 
attorney is “aware of evidence of a material violation”); see also id. § 205.2(e) (“Evidence of a material 
violation means credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the 
circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a 
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.”).  
237. Sarbanes-Oxley is implicated when the attorney becomes “aware” that what has or is 
about to occur is evidently wrongful.  See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 
51,715, 51,727 n.105 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249) (“‘Aware’ is a 
commonly used and well-defined English word, meaning ‘having knowledge; conscious; 
cognizant.’”). 
238. See supra Part II. subsection A. n.29–30. 
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lawyer’s failing in the gatekeeping role in the corporation’s arsenal of 
monitoring efforts.  
 Contrast the ethical breaches in hypotheticals A and B with the more 
limited failings in C.  In the latter scenario, the attorney unintentionally 
but unreasonably overlooked signals that, if noticed, would have led her to 
discover executive wrongdoing.  Although the unreasonable failing could, 
as noted earlier, ground a prima facie malpractice case by the corporation 
against the attorney, the question is whether knowledge of the executive’s 
wrongdoing should be imputed to the corporation under these 
circumstances.  The absence of an express undertaking to serve as a 
gatekeeper coupled with the absence of a special ethical or statutory 
obligation to discover and report on the ethical wrongdoing suggests that 
the attorney’s reporting duties, in these circumstances, would not satisfy 
the gatekeeper imputation exception.239  Thus, in this instance, the 
attorney could successfully interpose an in pari delicto defense.  
 Let us turn finally to Hypothetical E, in which the employee’s 
wrongdoing is directed at the corporation, whether in the form of theft 
from the company or some variation on that theme.  Here, the adverse-
interest exception applies, and knowledge of the executive’s wrongdoing 
would not be imputed to the corporation.  As a result, the attorney would 
not be able to interpose an in pari delicto defense.  There is no reason to 
invoke the gatekeeper exception in this scenario although it too might be 
satisfied,240 since the adverse-interest exception eliminates imputation.  
C. Gatekeeping and Comparative Negligence. 
 In those instances in which the gatekeeper imputation or adverse-
interest exception applies and the law firm cannot invoke an in pari delicto 
defense to a malpractice claim for its failure to discover an executive’s 
wrongdoing, the remaining question is how the corporation’s failings, if 
any, should bear on its malpractice claim against counsel.  The simple 
answer is that the corporation’s recovery should be reduced by its own 
negligence under principles of comparative negligence.241  In this section, 
we will examine how comparative negligence would play out in a failed 
 
239. As noted earlier, only ethics rules that impose specific gatekeeping duties should ground 
such implied duties, and not the general competence or communication requirements of RPC 1.1 
and 1.4, respectively.  See supra Part V. subsection A. 
240. See discussion of Hypothetical E in Part I. subsection B. 
241. See RONALD MALLEN, JEFFREY SMITH & ALLISON RHODES, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
§ 22.2 n.7 (2014) (listing jurisdictions that allow attorneys to seek to reduce malpractice recovery 
based on the comparative negligence of the client). 
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gatekeeper malpractice claim.  Thus, the challenge here is what would 
constitute evidence of negligence on the part of the board of directors in 
the absence of actual or implied knowledge of the executive’s planned 
wrongdoing.242   
     The corporation’s failings to monitor could take a variety of forms.  For 
example, the board might have failed to install other monitoring 
procedures or systems that would enable it to learn of wrongdoing.  It may 
have created an environment where wrongful behavior was either ignored 
or tacitly rewarded by emphasizing profit and disregarding legal and ethical 
boundaries.  It may have refused to create channels for others to report on 
the executive’s behavior or punished those who took such action in the 
past.  The particulars notwithstanding, a corporation can share the blame 
for the failure to discover its own executive’s intentional or criminal 
wrongdoing—and comparative negligence would, in such case, reduce its 
recovery against counsel.   
The relative negligence of the corporation and the law firm may also 
vary with the reasonable expectations of the parties regarding their 
monitoring roles.  For example, when a corporation has expressly 
identified a problem for investigation by counsel, it may be reasonable for 
the corporation to substantially reduce its own investigative efforts on the 
question.  In such instance, its own failings to investigate the matter 
should not reduce its recovery.  On the other hand, when the law firm is 
only impliedly a gatekeeper, a jury could reduce the corporation’s recovery 
against counsel for the corporation’s failure to undertake its own, 
independent monitoring efforts.  The judgment would be fact sensitive. 
     Courts frequently justify the imputation to the corporation of 
knowledge of executive wrongdoing on the grounds that it will incentivize 
the corporation to monitor its agents. As noted earlier, however, the 
imputation of such knowledge can eliminate the incentive of law firms to 
perform their role properly, since imputation can insulate the law firm 
from liability under an in pari delicto defense. The gatekeeper imputation 
exception therefore eliminates imputation in those situations in which the 
attorney has expressly or impliedly undertaken a gatekeeping role, 
preserving the strong incentive for law firms to perform their assumed 
gatekeeping duties properly.  The gatekeeper-imputation exception does 
not eliminate the incentives of corporations to engage in monitoring, 
 
242. The Hypotheticals assumed that the corporation who is suing for malpractice had no 
actual knowledge of the executive’s criminal or fraudulent design.  If it had, of course, then the in 
pari delecto defense would apply without the need for imputation, and plaintiff’s claims would likely 
be barred under the in pari delicto defense.   
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however.  Corporations will continue to be accountable to third parties 
who are harmed by the executive wrongdoing, providing a strong incentive 
to maintain controls and monitoring efforts rather than relying solely on a 
contribution claim against counsel in defending such third-party claims.  
Second, boards of directors have duties of care that require monitoring 
regardless of imputation, which, in many instances will require a variety of 
controls in addition to counsel reporting, especially when the law firm has 
not expressly assumed a monitoring role.  Thus, even when the gatekeeper-
imputation exception applies, the corporation’s recovery for malpractice 
against its attorney will be subject to a comparative negligence defense, 
which will direct jury inquiries into the nature and extent of the 
corporation’s monitoring efforts.  
CONCLUSION 
I have proposed that we distinguish “external” gatekeeping, which 
protects third parties from harm by the corporation client, from “internal” 
gatekeeping, which protects the corporation from harm resulting from the 
wrongdoing of its own executives or other employees.  The distinction 
allows us to isolate the challenges that are unique to the latter role, which 
arise when corporations sue their lawyer for malpractice in failing to 
prevent executives from engaging in crimes for fraud, often against third 
parties, that ultimately result in substantial losses to the corporation.  
When we impute knowledge of the executive’s wrongdoing to the 
corporation, the in pari delicto defense essentially eliminates lawyer liability 
for internal-gatekeeper failings.  If the lawyer is categorically protected 
from liability to the corporation for failures to report executive 
wrongdoing, one can question whether the lawyer is an internal gatekeeper 
by any measure that matters.  Thus, the central question addressed by this 
Article: when should the in pari delicto defense bar claims by corporations 
against law firms for malpractice in their role as internal gatekeeper?  A 
review of the caselaw suggests that courts have not developed a clear or 
coherent answer to this question.243 
As a general matter, imputation and its adverse-interest exception seem 
sensible.  The corporation benefits from the acts of its agents, and should 
suffer the burden of the wrongdoing that agents effect on its behalf.  
Conversely, when the agent acts adversely to the corporation, we should 
 
243. See supra Part III. Subsection C.; see also Christine M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and 
the In Pari Delicto Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
275, 316–18 (2012) (noting that the correct application of the in pari delicto defense remains 
unclear). 
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not impute knowledge of such wrongdoing to the corporation.  These 
principles, though generally correct, fail to capture another concern, 
however: attorneys are often a critical part of the corporation’s means of 
monitoring its own agents.  Thus, the imputation rule and adverse-interest 
exception are a good start, but, standing alone, they fail to engage and 
reconcile the competing reasons to impute and reject imputation in the 
attorney gatekeeper setting. 
This Article proposes a second exception to the imputation rule. In 
addition to adverse-interest exception, attorneys should also be subject to a 
“gatekeeper-imputation” exception.  When the law firm has expressly or 
impliedly assumed an obligation to identify or report employee wrongdoing, 
then information that would have been discovered had the law firm fulfilled 
that obligation should not be imputed to the corporation for purposes of the in 
pari delicto defense.  A law firm expressly assumes a gatekeeping role when 
it agrees to undertake an investigation or monitoring role.  Gatekeeping 
duties are implied when required by the attorney’s ethical or statutory 
obligations. 
In each of the hypotheticals discussed in Part I, the attorney’s failings to 
investigate, discover, or report information are breaches of the duty of care.  
The failings, however, differ on closer examination.  They differ in 
whether the investigative role was express or implied, and whether the 
failings involved ethical or statutory obligations to investigate and report.  
These distinctions have been overlooked by courts, which have tended to 
disregard the type of lawyer failing in their imputation analysis.  The 
proposed standard invites courts to consider these distinctions in assessing 
when to allow lawyers to interpose an in pari delicto defense. 
The gatekeeper-imputation test allows the corporation and the client to 
adjust their rights and responsibilities by advance agreement.  In the 
absence of an express understanding or undertaking, courts can find an 
implied gatekeeping duty in certain, carefully delimited circumstances.  
The attorney’s negligence, standing alone, is not sufficient to invoke the 
gatekeeper-imputation exception.  When lawyers breach their ethical and 
statutory duties to investigate, discover and/or report employee crimes and 
fraud, the exception would apply, and imputation would not be 
appropriate in corporation claims against the attorney for malpractice in 
failing to discover or report the wrongdoing in question.  When the 
attorney’s information discovery and reporting roles, though negligent, are 
not breaches of attorney’s ethical or statutory gatekeeping requirements, 
lawyers should be allowed to interpose an in pari delicto defense.  When 
imputation is not appropriate, the corporation’s recovery for malpractice 
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will be reduced by a comparative negligence defense, which will direct jury 
inquiries into the nature and extent of the corporation’s monitoring efforts 
beyond counsel. 
Courts frequently justify imputation to the corporation of knowledge of 
executive wrongdoing on the grounds that it will incentivize the 
corporation to monitor its agents.244  As noted earlier, however, the 
imputation of such knowledge can reduce the incentive of law firms to 
perform their internal-gatekeeping role, since imputation can insulate the 
law firm from liability under an in pari delicto defense.  The gatekeeper-
imputation exception respects the normative basis for imputation, while 
incentivizing corporation boards of directors to maintain internal controls 
and lawyers to satisfy their ethical and statutory internal-gatekeeping 
duties. 
 
 
 
244. See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 826 (Del. Ch. 2009) (discussing imputation 
and how it “incentivizes independent directors and even stockholders to be effective monitors of 
managerial behavior”). 
